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List of German terms and abbreviations
BRD

Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Federal Republic of Germany, colloquially
and occasionally referred to as West Germany, in English often
abbreviated FRG*

DDR

Deutsche Demokratische Republik, German Democratic Republic,
colloquially and occasionally referred to as East Germany, in English
often abbreviated GDR

Gemeinde

Used to refer to the Jüdische Gemeinde zu Groß-Berlin, Jewish
Community of Greater Berlin

IfD

Institut für Denkmalpflege, Institute for Historic Preservation

KdAW

Komitee der Antifaschistichen Widerstandskämpfer, Committee of
Antifascist Resistance Fighters

KPD

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, German Communist Party

Magistrat

East Berlin municipal government

OdF

Ausschüsse für die Opfer des Faschismus, Committees for the Victims of
Fascism

SBZ

Sowjetische Besatzungszone, Soviet Occupation Zone

SED

Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Socialist Unity Party

SMAD

Sowjetische Militäradministration Deutschlands, Soviet Military
Authority of Germany

Verband

Used to refer to the Verband der jüdischen Gemeinden in der DDR,
Association of Jewish Communities in the DDR

VVN

Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, Association of those
Persecuted by the Nazi Regime

*After 1990, unified Germany is also called the Federal Republic of Germany. Since this time
period only comes up in the conclusion of this work, this abbreviation will almost always refer to
West Germany.
For the sake of consistency, all abbreviations will be based on German names. Unless otherwise
indicated all translations from German—including of archival materials, newspapers, and
German-language secondary sources—are my own, and I am responsible for any errors in
translation.
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Introduction
Consider the following two portraits of the Jewish cemetery in the northeastern Berlin
neighborhood of Weissensee, approximately one hundred years apart. The first begins with the
cemetery’s consecration, on September 9, 1880, Erev Rosh Hashanah. Since the second cemetery
established by the Jewish community (Gemeinde) in Berlin was nearly full, the Gemeinde
needed to establish a new one; according to Jewish tradition, no gravesite should ever be
removed or used again. The Gemeinde’s leaders settled on a site over 100 acres in area just
outside of Berlin’s then-border, a size that could not be matched within the limits of the city. The
grand plot reflected the Gemeinde’s confidence in their community’s capacity to grow and
thrive. In 1880—about a decade after Jews were granted full rights as citizens of the Prussian
empire in 1869—Berlin was home to 65,000 Jews, and the number was expected to increase.1
And when it did, members would eventually die, and there would need to be plenty of space to
bury the dead and protect the memory of their lives properly. The Gemeinde abided by this tenet,
summarized by one Dr. Frankl, the Gemeinde’s assistant rabbi, at the consecration ceremony to a
group of 200 invitees: “A community that honors its dead honors itself.”2
The first Jewish cemetery, established in 1672 in Berlin-Mitte on Große Hamburger
Straße, and the second, established in 1827 on Schönhauser Allee in the neighborhood of
Prenzlauer Berg, were both full. In 1875 the Gemeinde acquired the plot in Weissensee and in
1878 held a competition for the design of the cemetery. Out of 25 submissions, the leaders
settled on Hugo Licht’s design, which featured tight geometric plots bordered by intersecting
paths and interspersed with circular gardens as well as a mourning hall and arcade near the

1

Britta Wauer, Der jüdische Friedhof Weissensee: Momente der Geschichte (Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2010), 15.
Gideon Joffe, “Preface” in 115,628 Berliners: The Weissensee Jewish Cemetery – Documentation of the
Comprehensive Survey of the Burial Sites (Berlin: Landesdenkmalamt, 2013), 10.
2

1

The entrance to the Jewish cemetery in Berlin-Weissensee at the end of Herbert-Baum-Straße.

entrance, inspired by Italian Renaissance churches.3 In its design, this cemetery was already
unique among its peers, and its uniqueness would only become more clear with the construction
of gravesites in a wide range of styles and sizes, reflecting the spectrum of Jewish life in Berlin,
the German capital and increasingly a worldly European city, in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. There were modest gravestones of all the same height, with traditional
inscriptions in Hebrew, and elaborately sculpted and lavishly decorated family mausoleums that
displayed wealth and, implicitly, assimilation into bourgeois German society.4 As one rabbi,
interviewed for a recent documentary about the cemetery, observed, the extravagant memorial

3
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Wauer, Der jüdische Friedhof Weissensee, 15.
Ibid., 16.
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graves “[have] fundamentally nothing to do with Judaism.”5 Other non-traditional elements
added to the cemetery—a garden in 1887, flowers from which were laid on graves, rather than
the small stones traditional in Jewish culture; a new ordinance issued by the Gemeinde in 1909
that allowed cremation, historically forbidden, and the burial of urns in a special section of the
cemetery—further indicated the degree to which Berlin’s Jews felt they had assimilated.6 In the
First World War, thousands of young Jewish Germans volunteered to fight for their homeland,
and 12,000 of them died in battle. A portion of the cemetery, 49 meters wide and 90 meters long,
was set aside as a field of honor (Ehrenfeld) for them, and a memorial to the fallen Jewish
soldiers was dedicated to their memory in June 1927.7

Ornate gravesites in the Jewish cemetery in Berlin-Weissensee.

This portrait of the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee at the turn of the twentieth century
documents what some may call the golden years of Jewish life in Berlin. The second portrait to
consider was painted decades later by American journalist and filmmaker Richard Kostelanetz,

5

Rabbi William Wolff, in Wauer, Der jüdische Friedhof Weissensee, 28.
Der Jüdische Friedhof in Berlin-Weissensee: Ein Wegweiser durch seine Geschichte (Berlin: edition progris,
2003), 27, 37.
7
Wauer, Der jüdische Friedhof Weissensee, 16; Der Jüdische Friedhof in Berlin-Weissensee, 29.
6
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and it is a vastly different one. In a 1987 piece for The New York Times, Kostelanetz pined for
that era of prosperity and confidence of Berlin’s Jewish community, which he found obscured by
signs of recent neglect: overgrown plants, gravestones overturned by nature or man that had not
been stood upright, few gardeners who can only take care of the paths. He appreciated the
diversity of Jewish experiences represented in the cemetery—those of the bourgeois lawyers,
doctors, writers, musicians, assimilated in German society; those of the Ostjuden, more
conservative Jews originally from Eastern Europe; those of ultraorthodox communities formed in
response to the Reform movement—and lamented the lack of such variety and vitality in 1980s
Berlin, on either side of the Iron Curtain. “When asked which Berlin I like best,” Kostelanetz
writes, “I reply that the Berlin I like most of all is the old city, represented in Weissensee.”8
What happened to “the old city,” the one in which every third Jew in Germany lived?9
Beginning in the late 1920s, the period of great prosperity for Berlin’s Jews came to an end.
With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, many people lost their jobs, including Jews, and
they could no longer afford to build the lavish gravesites of years past. Soon after that, the rise of
the Nazis threatened not only the socio-economic status in German society many Jews had come
to occupy, but their citizenship status as well. Even as the Nazis stripped Jews of their rights and
liberties, the cemetery remained under Jewish administration. But that did not prevent the Nazis
from welding off iron railings and decorations from graves during their summer 1938 “scrap
metal campaign” in preparation for war. Cemetery administrators pleaded with the metalsmiths
to at least spare the metal and bronze lettering on some graves and plaques.10 Sensing the
momentum of the Nazis’ antisemitic actions, especially following the Novemberpogrom (called

8

Richard Kostelanetz, “A Lost World Interred in Berlin” The Weissensee cemetery in East Berlin recalls a
flourishing prewar Jewish community,” The New York Times, November 8, 1987.
9
This was the statistic by the 1920s. Wauer, Der jüdische Friedhof Weissensee, 39.
10
Ibid., 41.
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Kristallnacht by the Nazis) attacks on Jewish businesses and properties of November 9 and 10,
1938, the Gemeinde began using the garden and greenhouse in the Weissensee cemetery as a sort
of training ground for young Jews hoping to emigrate—the skills would increase their chances of
obtaining an immigration permit to Palestine and could be used to survive in their new home.11
In 1942, the same year that the Nazis decided on the “Final Solution” at the Wannsee
Conference, the number of suicides in the Jewish community increased markedly. According to
cemetery records, of the 3,257 people buried in Weissensee that year, at least 823 of them died
by suicide.12 Burials and ceremonies continued to be held, carried out by the remaining members
of the Jewish community in Berlin. Wave after wave of deportations shrank the cemetery staff
from 267 in the mid-1920s to 100 in 1942 to 12 by the end of the war; the only ones who
remained were those who were protected because they were married to non-Jews.13 A special
burial ground was created for papier-mâché urns containing the ashes of Jews murdered in death
camps at Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Mauthausen, Ravensbruck, and Sachsenhausen.14
Between 1941 and 1945, the Nazis murdered six million European Jews, as well as
millions of political prisoners, Roma-Sinti, homosexuals, and disabled individuals. In 1933, the
Jewish population of Berlin was 170,000; in 1945, it was 7,000. In the late 1930s and early
1940s, over 115,000 Jews took their fate into their own hands by emigrating from Germany.
After the war, tens of thousands of survivors became refugees, fleeing “the Land of the
Murderers.”15 Many relocated to the United States and Palestine, where the Jewish state of Israel
was established in 1948. As they began the process of rebuilding their lives and their

11

Ibid.; Alfred Etzold, et al, Jüdische Friedhöfe in Berlin (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1987), 80.
Wauer, Der jüdische Friedhof Weissensee, 73.
13
Ibid.
14
Etzold, et al, Jüdische Friedhöfe in Berlin, 78.
15
Leslie Morris and Jack Zipes, Unlikely History: The Changing German-Jewish Symbiosis, 1945-2000 (New York:
Palgrave, 2002), xxi.
12

5

communities, which could never be fully achieved, they wrote and spoke and wrote some more,
recording their memories and beseeching the world, “Never again.” On the one hand, there
would appear little left to be explained about the disappearance of “the old city represented in
Weissensee.”
On the other hand, the American journalist visiting the Weissensee cemetery in 1987
seems to offer an additional explanation for its disappearance, one tied to the fact of the
cemetery’s location, in the 1980s, in the capital of East Germany, the German Democratic
Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, hereafter DDR). Kostelanetz reported, “The few
East Berliners I spoke to who know about Weissensee tend to regard it as ‘the last relic of the
bourgeois age,’” representing something antithetical to East Germany’s Communist regime
under the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, hereafter SED). As a
result, the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee represented “a past that … they are trying to forget.”
In some ways, the endeavor of this project is determining whether this conclusion was
correct: Was the neglect of the Weissensee cemetery intentional? If so, to what end? To “forget”
a bourgeois, Jewish past? And who, exactly, were “they”: the leaders of the East German regime,

Present day examples of overturned, overgrown gravesites in the Jewish cemetery in Berlin-Weissensee.
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or the East Germans themselves? More broadly, this project answers the question of what it
means for a regime to preserve an historical object or site in the first place.
This project intends to tell the other side of the story, as well, about community and
tradition. What did a cemetery, reminiscent of “the old city,” mean for the postwar, postHolocaust Jewish community of Berlin, and what could they do about it? Must they cooperate
with a new elite that held a different view on the past, or could they exercise a degree of
autonomy? Could their perspective even be unified anyway? While this is a story about
memorialization and memory, it is also about survival, in a place where one would least expect
to find it. It is about the perseverance of Jewish life in a new, constantly changing country, it is
an exploration of the way that that life changed with it.
There has been no shortage of writing on Germany’s postwar history, particularly as it
relates to the legacy of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. There has been so much discussion
about dealing with the Nazi past in Germany(s) that the topic has been given a (stereotypically
long and complicated) German name and a field of study in its own right:
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which means “coming to terms with the past.” Whether the topic
was approached through the lens of literature or film,16 national holidays or commemoration
ceremonies,17 architecture or construction of memorials,18 or comparison with West Germany,19
the general consensus among scholars is that, in the DDR, this process of “coming to terms” with

16

Geoffrey Hartman, ed., Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994); Thomas
C. Fox, Stated Memory: East Germany and the Holocaust, Studies in German Literature, Linguistics, and Culture
(Rochester: Camden House, 1999).
17
John R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994).
18
Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997);,James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1993.
19
Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1997).
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the Nazi past was virtually non-existent. In East Germany, many scholars agree, the process of
legitimizing a story of socialist revolution over fascist tyranny and veneration of the Soviet
Union and Communist heroes took precedent over the pressure (and some might say the
necessity) to identify with Germany’s ugly recent past and accept responsibility for it. This
narrative of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the DDR is assumed or implied in studies that focus
on the lives of Jews in the DDR as well. Studies on the relationship between the Jews and the
SED, the dominant political party in an essentially single-party state, tend to assume that the
state was unconcerned with supporting its Jewish citizens despite the recent suffering many of
them experienced. Scholars have characterized this relationship as one based, primarily, on
neglect and, occasionally, on exploitation for political gain.20 Some historians claim that the Jews
were supported by the regime, until the relationship turned hostile in the early 1950s before
cooling down to be simply tolerant for the remaining decades of the DDR’s existence.21
Following these earliest studies of monolithic “Jews” in East Germany, Communist Jews have
been singled out for more specialized study due to their unique position, at times precarious,
between two groups that were often considered distinct from, if not wholly antagonistic toward,
one another by previous scholars.22

20

Marianne Krüger-Potratz, Anderssein gab es nicht: Ausländer und Minderheiten in der DDR (Münster:
Waxmann, 1991); Jutta Illichmann, Die DDR und die Juden: die deutschlandpolitische Instrumentalisierung von
Juden und Judentum durch die Partei- und Staatsführung der SBZ/DDR von 1945 bis 1990, Europäische
Hochschulschriften. Reihe XXXI, Politikwissenschaft ; Bd. 336 (Frankfurt am Main: PLang, 1997); Angelika
Timm, Jewish Claims against East Germany: Moral Obligations and Pragmatic Policy (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 1997).
21
Jay Howard Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 1945-1953 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Mario Kessler, Die SED und die Juden: zwischen Repression und Toleranz : politische
Entwicklung bis 1967 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).
22
Karin Hartewig, Zurückgekehrt: die Geschichte der jüdischen Kommunisten in der DDR (Köln: Böhlau, 2000);
Jay Howard Geller and Michael Meng, eds., Rebuilding Jewish Life in Germany, (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2020).
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The approach of this study is to combine aspects of previous studies—memorialization,
nation building, the experiences of Jews in the DDR—in a parallel history of the establishment
and maintenance of the DDR and the re-establishment of the Jewish community there, with a
particular focus on the East Berlin Jewish community. It is, moreover, a history of the overlap,
the intersection or interaction, between these two. In what ways was the “project” of establishing
and legitimizing a socialist East German state—wholly distinct from its fascist Nazi forebears
and the competing West German capitalists—helped and hindered by the attempts of the Jewish
community to fulfill its needs and wants, and vice versa? To narrow my scope in an achievable
project, I follow the course of the relationship between the state and the Jews by focusing on
sites of historical significance, particularly returning to the Jewish cemetery in BerlinWeissensee. From the first years after the war, when the Jewish community faced vandalism and
desecration and the ravages of war on its cemetery, to the late-1970s, when the cemetery came
under protection as a monument of cultural history, this paper asks the question, how did the
Jewish community and the East German regime interact with the cemetery—and, by extension,
with one another—and why? To attempt to answer this question, I draw on several scholars in
particular who have studied the role of historic preservation in “memory work” and the
construction of a national mythology and national identity.23 Specialized historical studies in
East German sepulchral culture and historic preservation practices and policies have provided
context to my understanding of the interactions between the SED and the East German people
through the intricacies of cemetery administration and preservation, respectively.24
23

Rudy Koshar, Germany’s Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Alan Nothnagle, “From Buchenwald to Bismarck: Historical MythBuilding in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989,” Central European History 26, no. 1 (1993): 91–113;
Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German
Democratic Republic, 1945-1989 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999).
24
Felix Robin Schulz, Death in East Germany, 1945-1990 (New York: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2013),
especially Chapter 3: “Resting Places? Cemeteries in the GDR”; Brian William Campbell, “Resurrected from the
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In particular I have been influenced by the work of Michael Meng, a historian who has
studied the particular fate of significant Jewish sites in the DDR.25 In his article and subsequent
book, which is a comparative study of Jewish spaces in the two Germanys and Poland, Meng
takes a pessimistic view of the SED’s motivation for supporting Jewish communities, a
motivation he argues was also present among the leading Polish Communist Party: When they
finally do take action to preserve Jewish sites beginning in the 1970s, both the SED and the
Polish Communist Party did so as an act of “redemptive cosmopolitanism,” “a commemorative
display of multiethnicity that celebrates the cathartic, redemptive transformation of Germans and
Poles into tolerant democratic citizens.”26 While in his article Meng recognizes the impact of
activism on shifting the tides on attention to Jewish sites, highlighting action by local officials,
preservationists, church groups, and other residents ,27 in his book he emphasizes, rather, the
“growing transnationalization of Jewish sites” through tourism and the influence of conversation
about the Holocaust worldwide.28
Though Meng’s work has been deeply informative, I take a slightly different view on the
situation in the DDR. Meng views the relationship primarily from the SED’s point of view, the
actions as solely the result of political decisions made at the highest levels, the actions and
opinions of citizens of little consequence. Instead, I argue that the relationship between the SED
and the Jewish community is one of mutual benefit and reliance. The SED relies on its Jewish
citizens to maintain its image and claim to legitimacy as the antifascist German state; the Jews

Ruins, Turning to the Past: Historic Preservation in the SBZ/GDR 1945–1990” (Ph.D., University of Rochester,
2005); Silke Schumacher-Lange, “Denkmalpflege und Repräsentationskultur in der DDR. Der Wiederaufbau der
Straße Unter den Linden 1945 – 1989” (Ph.D., Universität Hildesheim, 2012).
25
Michael Meng, “East Germany’s Jewish Question: The Return and Preservation of Jewish Sites in East Berlin and
Potsdam, 1945–1989,” Central European History 38, no. 4 (December 2005): 606–36; Michael Meng, Shattered
Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Germany and Poland (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
26
Meng, Shattered Spaces, 2011.
27
Meng, “East Germany’s Jewish Question,” 609.
28
Meng, Shattered Spaces, 12.
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rely on the party to provide (primarily financial) support. I find that this relationship stays largely
constant throughout the history of the DDR, but there were also moments of protest and
outspoken opposition to the regime’s treatment of Jewish sites. As vulnerable members of East
German society without a lot of clout, Jews largely had to adapt their demands and requests to fit
within the constraints of the SED’s regime. But non-Jewish East Germans as well as critics
outside of the DDR placed pressure on the state to reform its practices. Such protests threatened
to unveil the SED’s strategy vis à vis its Jewish citizens and revealed weakness in the party’s
claim to legitimacy, and thus, its rule on the whole. Through the lens of preserving historic sites,
especially the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee, I can pinpoint moments of change in the strategies
of the SED and the Jews.
This paper draws on archival materials, especially from two archives in Berlin, the
Centrum Judaicum Archiv at the Stiftung Neue Synagoge and Landesarchiv. The former holds
the documents of the organized Jewish community of Berlin (Jüdische Gemeinde zu GroßBerlin, hereafter Gemeinde), as well as correspondence with government officials on the local
and national level. Visiting the latter proved especially fruitful because it holds the numerous
requests for funding and letters from the Gemeinde, as well as internal memos of Berlin city
government officials explaining why certain decisions were made. This project uses newspaper
coverage to gauge the priorities of the regime, if not an honest representation of public opinion,
and occasionally draws on first-hand accounts of Jewish life in the DDR, from interviews,
memoirs, and biographies.29 Methodologically, this paper makes occasional, brief references to
29

Helmut Eschwege, Fremd unter meinesgleichen: Erinnerungen eines Dresdener Juden (Berlin: Christoph Links
Verlag, 1991); Elena Lappin, ed., Jewish Voices, German Words: Growing up Jewish in Postwar Germany and
Austria, first edition (North Haven, CT: Catbird Press, 1994); Barbara Honigmann, Roman von einem Kinde: Sechs
Erzählungen (Hamburg: Luchterband Literaturverlag, 1989); Barbara Honigmann, Damals, dann und danach
(Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999); Robin Ostow, Jews in Contemporary East Germany: The Children of Mosesin
the Land of Marx (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Robin Ostow, Juden aus der DDR und die deutsche
Wiedervereinigung: Elf Gespräche (Berlin: Wichern-Verlag, 1996); Richard Chaim Schneider, Wir sind da!: Die
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other socialist countries and, given the great influence of the Cold War, to the western Federal
Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, hereafter BRD), though this is not intended
to be a comparative study.
The first chapter focuses on the period from 1945 to 1953, from the immediate postwar,
post-Holocaust fallout to the early years of the DDR. It begins with the struggles of the
remaining Jews in Germany, especially in the eastern zone under Soviet occupation, which
would become a haven for German Communists returning from exile, seeking to fulfill their
vision of a socialist German state. The German Communists, considering themselves the primary
victims of Nazi persecution, clashed with the surviving Jews, whose suffering was placed below
that of Communist “antifascist resistance fighters” in a constructed moral hierarchy. At the same
time, tensions between the Allied Powers occupying Germany grew as they tried to determine
the fate of Germany. The Soviets in the eastern zone disagreed with almost all proposals by the
Americans, French, and British occupying the western zones of Germany, and vice versa; the
ideological rift also played out in Berlin, which was similarly divided in four sectors. The two
sources of conflict—between individuals on the one hand and international superpowers on the
other—had material effects on the nascent Jewish Gemeinde in Berlin and across Germany; this
chapter highlights as an example the topic of restitution of Jewish properties. The chapter ends in
first few years of the DDR, which appeared calm until the winter of 1952-1953, when
Stalinization across the Eastern bloc led to a surge of antisemitic purges and show trials,
including of high-profile SED members sympathetic to the Jewish citizens of the DDR. The
period ended with a Jewish mass exodus, this time from East to West Germany.

Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland von 1945 bis heute (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2000). Karin Hartewig’s
Zurückgekehrt offers biographical vignettes of prominent Jewish communists.
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In the second chapter I turn to the SED’s attempts to define a foundational myth and
national history through preservation of historical sites from the early 1950s through the 1960s.
These early measures, not legally binding and thus inconsistently enforced and subject to the
wills of individual preservationists, did not cover Jewish sites. The initial goals of preservation
were, ironically, destruction of anything connected to the Nazi regime in hopes of defeating the
memory of the regime as well. Simultaneously, the SED prioritized the restoration and building
up of sites related to antifascist resistance, which became the founding myth and identity of the
DDR. This, in the context of the Cold War, became essential for the DDR to distinguish itself
from the BRD. As in debates about victimhood and restitution described in the first chapter, the
propagation of such a myth came at the cost of the recognition of Jewish sites, history, and
victimhood. Some Jews in elevated positions—as Communists or as outsiders—protested the
omission of their history, as I will explore in the case of the antifascist memorial of liberation at
the former Buchenwald concentration camp, a sort of counterexample to the Jewish cemetery in
Weissensee.
The period of most change for the Weissensee cemetery is the period from 1970 to the
mid-1980s, which is the focus of the third chapter. It is during these years that the cemetery, as
well as other Jewish sites, first come under legal protection as sites to be preserved by the East
German state. This coincides with the softening of Cold War tensions between East and West
Germany, due to the advent of BRD Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the signing of
subsequent treaties that offered the DDR the international and diplomatic recognition it had
always wanted. One of the most important Cold War developments was signing of the Helsinki
Accords, which declared a commitment to the protection of human rights for all. The DDR
signing onto the Helsinki Accords created the proper conditions for East Germans citizens to
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protest the SED’s actions, including its treatment of Jewish sites, and receive international press
coverage. This would be the case when the Berlin city government resurrected a plan to build a
road through the Weissensee cemetery, which was stopped by the words of activists, Jewish and
non-Jewish alike.
While it includes many instances of neglect and suppression of the Jews and their history,
this story is not intended to be a demoralizing one. Indeed, amid all the tension, persecution, and
destruction that comes in between, this story begins and ends hopefully. Where it begins is
shortly after a Red Army soldier entered through the gates of the Weissensee cemetery on April
23, 1945, where he was met by the cemetery staff, tearful, embracing, who had hidden in the
still-standing buildings, amid partially bombed out gravestones and trees. Parts of the cemetery
were destroyed and many more lives, but these ones remained, and they knew that their suffering
at the hands of the Nazis was over.30 The Soviets defeated the Nazis in Berlin on May 2, 1945.
After that, one of the most remarkable, most hopeful signs of life concealed in the cemetery’s
landscape was discovered: nearly 600 Torah scrolls, hidden in one of the Halls of Mourning. The
scrolls had been looted from synagogues by the Nazis for an anti-Jewish propaganda exhibition,
but they were intercepted by Arthur Brass, the cemetery director, who in 1943 placed them in the
hall for safe keeping. Between 1943 and 1945, Weissensee was hit by over 60 bombing raids,
during which the hall and much of its contents were destroyed, along with the cemetery’s
greenhouse and some 4,000 graves. Miraculously, 480 of the Torah scrolls survived the war and
were distributed to Jewish communities around the world. The other 90 scrolls, unsalvageable,
were laid to rest in the cemetery.31
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On May 11, Rabbi Martin Riesenburger—who was protected by his marriage to a nonJewish woman, had continued to hold secret services in Weissensee beginning in 1943 while
children played around him and temporarily escaped persecution within the cemetery’s gates,
and had continued to give a proper burial for all, including for those who lived secretly in Berlin
and died in hiding32—led the first religious service to take place in the cemetery in plain sight, in
full safety, in over a decade. This is where our story begins.
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Chapter 1: Categories
It was imaginable—indeed plausible—that the Jews and Communists could have been
natural allies in a post-war, post-Holocaust Germany. Both were targeted by the Nazis as
enemies. Prior to the war, the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands,
hereafter KPD) at times indicated solidarity with the Jews of Germany, such as in a special
edition of the party’s underground publication Die Rote Fahne published in response to the
Novemberpogrom of November 9, 1938: “The German working class stands at the forefront of
the battle against the persecution of the Jews … The liberation of Germany from the shame of
the Jewish pogrom will coincide with the hour of the liberation of the German people from the
brown tyranny.”1
However, in the years immediately following the end of the war, disagreements among
Jews and Communists complicated such an easy alliance. The period between the end of the war
and the founding of two German states in 1949 was characterized by drawn out negotiations
about the nature of fascism and antifascism, responsibility and victimhood, and resistance. In the
eastern zone of Germany, the Soviet Occupation Zone (Sowjetische Besatzungszone, hereafter
SBZ) and Soviet-occupied eastern sector of Berlin, to which many exiled German Communists
returned, in addition to non-Communist Jews who had lived there before deportation, the
interests of Communists won out over those of the Jews due the construction of a moral
hierarchy that privileged “fighters against fascism” over mere “victims of fascism,” comprising
Jews and others persecuted for non-political reasons. Communists all but secured political
hegemony in the area with the absorption of the KPD and the Social Democrats into the Socialist
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Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, hereafter SED) in 1946. Policies
enacted during this period reflected the interests of the SED, which did not necessarily represent
the interests of the few remaining Jews. The voracity with which many Jewish leaders and their
allies had to defend their interests, only to be drowned out, exhausted and disillusioned caused
many of them to abandon the fight, further bolstering the Communist majority and perhaps
contributing to the presumption in today’s scholarship that Jews lacked agency in the DDR.2
Consequences of Communist-oriented policies were also material, affecting the financial
support given to survivors as well as the ability of the Jewish to re-acquire properties stolen from
them by the Nazis and inherited by the Soviet military government. Thus begun a dependent
relationship between the Jews of SBZ and SED officials. Lacking both manpower and financial
power, the Jewish community of Berlin,3 on whom I will focus (with intermittent mentions of the
SBZ- and eventually state-wide community) relied on those in power to grant them requests for
funds and other shows of support. Though it would appear that the community would have very
little room to maneuver in this relationship, the Gemeinde still sought out creative ways to
persuade the SED to fulfill their needs, even if those needs did not align with the party’s goals.
This relationship was not one-sided, however, for the SED, too, was but a young political
party working to claim control over a state that did not yet exist—one that Britain, France, and
especially the United States wanted to prevent at all costs. They attempted to wrangle the Soviet
Union’s influence, which was essential in propping up the SED, through joint governance of the
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German territory and Berlin, but the ideological rift between the Western Allies and the Soviets
proved increasingly difficult to overcome in order to build consensus about the fate of Germany.
Early debates on such topics as restitution of Jewish communal properties reveal the deepening
differences between the occupying powers. To demonstrate the moral and political correctness of
its policies and ideology over its opponents, the SED at times relied on its relationship with the
Jews, or the portrayal thereof, to argue that it had eradicated all remnants of fascism, including
antisemitism.
In the relationship between the Jews and the SED, the Weissensee cemetery would
become a touchstone, an object where interests collided and the two parties interacted. The Jews
used the cemetery, one of the few pieces of property it still owned, as a sort of bargaining chip to
try to gain other benefits from the SED, and the party used the cemetery, partially destroyed
during the war and the target of several instances of desecration and vandalism, as a place to
exhibit its morality and care for its vulnerable residents. The story of this relationship, which will
endure Cold War tensions, SED and Jewish community leadership changes, and bouts of
discrimination and persecution for decades to come, begins here.

Rebuilding Jewish life
It is estimated that approximately 7,000 Jews remained in Berlin at the conclusion of the
Second World War. They had survived various conditions and by various means: approximately
1,500 had survived imprisonment in concentration camps, over 1,400 had spent the war in hiding
in Berlin, and more than 4,000 were protected by a marriage to a non-Jewish German.4 Almost
immediately, some of these survivors began efforts to establish a formal Jewish community that
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could begin the work of distributing supplies and assistance and of reclaiming Jewish communal
properties stolen by the Nazis. Eventually, the early leaders hoped, there could be once again be
a vibrant Jewish community like the one that had existed in Berlin prior to 1933. One of those
first leaders was Heinz Galinski, who had survived imprisonment in Auschwitz and the death
march to Bergen-Belsen; his motivation, he later recalled, after he returned to Berlin in July
1945, was “to give back to the survivors the belief in a restored, new life.”5
Efforts to reestablish a Jewish community in Berlin were stymied both by the occupying
Soviet Military Authority of Germany (Sowjetische Militäradministration Deutschlands,
hereafter SMAD) and by disagreements among the surviving Jews. Would the new community
be a successor to the Reich Union of Jews in Germany, established and strongly supervised by
the Nazis in 1939, or try to distance itself as much as possible?6 Who would be accepted as
members: religious Jews only, or secular Jews as well?7 By November 1946, the Berlin
Magistrat, a semi-autonomous local government established by the SMAD, had granted legal
status to an autonomous representative body called the Jüdische Gemeinde zu Groß-Berlin
(Jewish Community of Greater Berlin, hereafter Gemeinde), one which aimed to unify and
incorporate “all the Jews of Berlin,” across the Eastern and Western sectors.8 The Gemeinde
adopted a religious definition of “Jewishness” to determine membership, though this decision
proved controversial.9 There were also the Jewish Communists who returned to Germany from
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exile after the war. Their numbers in Berlin are not easily estimated, since many were secular
and were not counted among the members of the Gemeinde. East German historian (and Jewish
Communist himself) Helmut Eschwege estimated that approximately 3,500 “politically
motivated” Jews returned to Germany before 1953.10
In terms of properties, the Berlin Gemeinde possessed very few at the conclusion of the
war. Among them were the Weissensee cemetery and a hospital in the neighborhood of
Wedding.11 In the SBZ as a whole, another 70 to 80 properties once owned by the Jewish
community of Berlin and seized by the Nazis had been confiscated by the Soviets. In the years to
come, the Berlin Magistrat’s Office for Church Matters (originally Beirat für kirchliche
Angelegenheiten, after 1950 Amt für Kirchenfragen) dealt with requests from the Gemeinde for
repair and restitution, and it even established an office of Adviser for Jewish Affairs. The Office
for Church Matters also received complaints about the misuse of Jewish property by the Soviets,
even those pieces still technically in possession of the Gemeinde.12 But before turning to the
restitution debate and its implications for material support of Jewish survivors in Berlin, new
organizations formed in the city to support survivors warrant examination.
On top of significant support from international Jewish organizations, especially the
American Joint Distribution Committee, Jews in the eastern sector of Berlin began receiving
assistance from local informal “self-help organizations” called Committees for the Victims of
Fascism (Ausschüsse für die Opfer des Faschismus, hereafter OdF). These committees emerged
spontaneously across Berlin in order to provide immediate assistance in the form of food,
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clothing, and medical supplies to those recently liberated from concentration camps, death
marches, and other forms of imprisonment.13 In the Eastern sector, survivors and supporters then
formed formal committees, and with permission from the SMAD in June 1945, the Main
Committee of OdF (Hauptausschuss für den OdF). Three months later, a committee of the same
name was created as a department of the Main Office for Social Welfare of the Berlin Magistrat.
But who was considered a “victim of fascism”? On May 27, 1945, the Magistrat stated
that anyone who could prove their status as a “victim of fascism” would be entitled to a one-time
issuance of support in the form of a “special allocation” of food for a period of three months,
housing, and 450 Reichsmarks. Thereafter, however, only “active political fighters” were
eligible for such or similar subsidies.14 “Fighters against fascism” (Kämpfer gegen Faschismus)
had thus emerged as a status that was still included under the umbrella term “victims of fascism”
but one that also awarded a privileged status to those who ‘demonstrated’ resistance to the Nazi
regime. To further delineate categories of “victims,” a department for “victims of the Nuremberg
Laws” was created within the Magistrat’s OdF, with Julius Meyer, a prominent Communist Jew,
appointed its leader.15 The precise bureaucracy of these offices and committees was less
important than the distinction they aimed to create: between political “fighters” and racial or
religious “victims.”
Members of the OdF committees across Germany convened in Leipzig in October 1945
to clear up ambiguities around the categories. The fact that most of the members were
Communists and believed in a hierarchy of victimhood that placed Communists above Jews was
clear in the debates that took place. Karl Raddatz, the secretary of the Berlin Magistrat’s Main
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Committee of the OdF, clarified that only the “fighters” of Nazism should be considered the new
“moral and political elite.”16 Several prominent Jewish members of the OdF protested Raddatz’s
claim, including Meyer and Leon Löwenkopf, who headed the Dresden Jewish community. A
survivor of Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen, Löwenkopf offered a biting critique of Raddatz’
statement: “What would the world say … if we say ‘No, we don’t recognize you [Jews}’ … We
would make ourselves the joke of the world.”17 The protests of Meyer and Löwenkopf were
overpowered by other OdF members, who sided with Raddatz.
At the conclusion of the conference, the OdF decided on an official definition of “victim
of fascism” that broadly included both various categories of “fighters” and “victims.” Declared
among the “fighters” were members of illegal antifascist parties; those who emigrated for
political reasons; mercenaries for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War; participants in the
attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20, 1944; as well as the somewhat catch-all category of
the “many dauntless fighters of various resistance movements, who were imprisoned or were
placed in concentration camps as a result of their fight against Hitler.” Within the “victims”
category were the victims of the Nuremberg Laws, who had hidden illegally during the war,
were imprisoned in concentration camps, or generally were forced to wear the yellow Star of
David (Sternträger); Jehovah’s Witnesses; and those convicted of minor political offenses, called
“broadcast criminals” (Rundfunksverbrecher), “complainers” (Meckerer), and “labor saboteurs”
(Arbeitssaboteure).18
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Notably excluded from the “victims” category, save exceptional cases, were those Jews
who, due to “privileged marriages” with a non-Jew, were protected from persecution and
deportation. Also not mentioned in this definition of “victim of fascism” were Roma-Sinti
people, homosexuals, and the forcibly sterilized (Zwangssterilisierten). In early 1946 Roma-Sinti
were recognized as victims of the Nuremberg Laws with the publishing of the official guidelines
from the Berlin Main Committee. However, their recognition was contingent on evidence of a
secure residence and job, which most of them could not provide.19 In June 1946, the SBZ’s
Central Administration for Labor and Social Welfare counted 15,536 fighters against fascism
and 42,287 victims of fascism in the SBZ.20 This distinction between “fighters” and “victims”
was to be maintained and publicly acknowledged in the form of a stamp on the OdFadministered identification cards, and those with a “fighter” stamp were entitled to greater
material support.21
The favored status awarded the mostly Communist “fighters” was one source of tension
between the Allies. To the Americans, French, and British, “the victims of fascism were above
all the Jews,” as Elke Reuter and Detlef Hansel put it.22 The Western Allies’ discomfort with the
privileged position of “fighters” was clear, for example, when the French sector refused to host
activities planned by the OdF for the first annual Day of Remembrance for the Victims of
Fascism in September 1945.23 Though the activities included services for the religiously
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persecuted and a speech recognizing the particular suffering of women prisoners in concentration
camps and thus memorialized “victims of fascism” according to a broad definition, the political
motivation of the event was apparent in a large placard erected for the event that featured an
upside down red triangle, the same one affixed to political prisoners of concentration camps,
with the letters “KZ” (for Konzentrationslager, or concentration camp).24
A new organization founded in February 1947 aimed to reconcile the tension between the
Allies about the definition of “victims of fascism.” The Association of Those Persecuted by the
Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, hereafter VVN) united the
committees of victims across the Soviet-occupied zone in a self-described “non-partisan and
non-denominational organization.” The VVN’s lofty goals included strengthening democratic
institutions, eradicating “race fanaticism” (Rassenwahn), restitution for the persecuted, and care
for the surviving dependents as a legal duty of the German people.25 Though many of the mostly
Communist members of the OdF remained in the VVN, they appeared willing to back off their
hierarchy of victimhood, declaring in VVN founding documents that the terms “politically
persecuted” (politisch verfolgt) and “racially persecuted” (rassisch verfolgt) should be dropped.26
One year later the VVN declared its dedication to forging an “undivided democratic
German republic in the same sense of the principal statement issued by the Allied Powers at the
Potsdam Conference.”27 Western Allies allowed the VVN to establish itself in their sectors of

24

Peter Monteath provides a fascinating year-by-year account of the growing tensions between the Allied powers
through the planning of the Day of Remembrance. Peter Monteath, “A Day to Remember: East Germany’s Day of
Remembrance for the Victims of Fascism,” German History 26, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 195–218.
25
“…als Pflicht des deutschen Volkes gesetzlich zu regeln.” “Organisationsstatut der VVN in der sowjetischen
Besatungszone, angenommen auf der Gründungskonferenz in Berlin, 22/23. Februar 1947,” and “Programm der
VVN in der sowjetischen Besatungszone, angenommen auf der Gründungskonferenz in Berlin, 22./23. Februar
1947,”both in Reuter and Hansel, Das kurze Leben der VVN von 1947 bis 1953, 589-592.
26
Reuter and Hansel, Das kurze Leben der VVN von 1947 bis 1953, 127.
27
“Vorwärts im Kampf für die Einheit Deutschlands. Entschließung der 2. Hauptkonferenz der VVN in der
sowjetischen Besatzungszone in Halle, 24. Februar 1948, in Reuter and Hansel, Das kurze Leben der VVN von 1947
bis 1953, 605. At the Potsdam Conference, the Allies stated a commitment to, among other things, preparing “for the

24

Berlin, but they remained skeptical that the agenda of the organization was truly apolitical and
never allowed for the formation of a national organization. Their suspicions were not unfounded,
for in the same statement calling for the unity of Germany, the VVN highlighted the resistance of
“former political prisoners”:
More than 20 million people from all lands met the horrors of the Nazi terror in prisons,
penitentiaries and concentration camps. … Despite these horrors, upstanding men and
women of varying political affiliations, religions, races and nationalities managed to
resist the Nazi regime. A collective fight and a collective suffering in the jails of the
Gestapo and in the concentration camps brought together the former political prisoners in
an unbreakable community based on destiny and fighting.28
Displays of antisemitism and Cold War divides
To the Western Allies, the way organizations with Communist leadership repeatedly
neglected the particular victimhood of the Jews was antisemitic. The nascent SED held quite the
opposite view. Following the Marxist-Leninist tradition, the SED understood antisemitism as a
mere symptom of fascism, defined by Comintern leader Georgi Dimitroff in 1935 as “the open
terrorist rule of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance
capital.”29 Antisemitism was considered another tool of the ruling class to oppress the German
working class in a capitalist system; if a capitalist society no longer existed, according to the
SED, neither would antisemitism.
The SED maintained, then, that as capitalist countries, the Western Allies were protofascist and negatively influencing the zones they occupied in Germany. Despite the Western
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Allies’ strong display of denazification during the Nuremberg trials of SS officers, the emerging
leadership in the East claimed that its efforts to eradicate former Nazis were greater.30 The SED
highlighted antisemitic incidents and attacks that happened in the western zones as further
evidence of the legacy of Nazism there, creating a contrast between the competing ideologies
before two distinct German states were even established. During this period, the SED, under
Soviet influence, challenged the West’s legitimacy, foreshadowing a struggle for international
recognition that would define much of East Germany’s politics in the decades to come.
One clear instance of the SED capitalizing on shows of antisemitism is found in a
February 1949 resolution “against inflammatory antisemitic propaganda” from the SED
Sekretariat, the executive council of the party. In the resolution, the Sekretariat condemned the
decision of the British occupation government to allow the showing of Oliver Twist in its
occupation zone and sector in Berlin.31 Since the appearance from 1837 to 1839 of the Charles
Dickens’ serial novels on which the film was based, Dickens had been criticized for employing
antisemitic stereotypes in his characterization of Fagin, a poor, old Jewish man who is the villain
in the story, and for conveying the character’s negative qualities as a result of his faith.32 The
Sekretariat called the film an “antisemitic piece of shoddy workmanship” (“dieses antisemitische
Machwerk”), noting that survivors of Nazi persecution in Berlin, Hamburg, and Hannover had
already protested the film and succeeded in forcing the British occupiers to remove Oliver Twist
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from theaters. In the final lines of the resolution, the SED endorsed this protest action, reminding
readers of the party’s stance on antisemitism:
The Socialist Unity Party of Germany demands the working population and all
progressive Germans, regardless of political, religious or union affiliation, to oppose the
humiliation of this antisemitic baiting with all of your energy, and to strengthen the
collective fight of all people for democracy and national independence in the face of this
trigger-happy propaganda of imperialists.33
The SED also frequently contested the West’s self-portrayal as the more democratic,
more free, and safer half of Germany for Jewish survivors by highlighting desecrations of Jewish
cemeteries in the western zones. The Sekretariat alluded to such incidents in its February 1949
resolution, “In the western occupation zones … Jewish cemeteries are desecrated almost daily.”34
While that was an exaggeration, it is true that there were dozens of instances of gravestones
toppled and sometimes vandalized with swastikas, though the SED failed to mention those that
occurred in the SBZ. Media coverage of cemetery desecrations that occurred in the East was
negligible, but when covering such incidents in the West, the SED-controlled newspapers made a
point to underscore the frequency with which they occurred. Headlines such as “Another
cemetery desecrated” were common,35 and if it was not reflected in the headline, the body of the
article nearly always made mention of the number of times such sites were attacked, almost
always shockingly high and always attributed to resurgent, or lingering, fascist sympathies.36 In
one instance in April 1950, the Berliner Zeitung reported that within five years, thirty Jewish
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cemeteries had been desecrated in the state of Hessen, located in the American zone of
occupation. To support the claim, these papers obtained quotes from Jews living in the West
about antisemitism. The president of Hessen’s Jewish community reportedly told Berliner
Zeitung, “The West German police always claim that the perpetrators are youths, but it seems
strange, that these ‘youths’ never attack non-Jewish cemeteries.”37
When these papers did report on desecrations of Jewish cemeteries in the eastern zone or,
later, in the DDR, it was not unusual for reporters and quoted individuals to blame the action on
Westerners. When ten gravestones in the Weissensee cemetery were overturned in June 1959,
both Neue Zeit (the paper of the Christian Democrats) and Berliner Zeitung (a publication close
to the SED but considered more editorially independent than the party’s official paper, Neues
Deutschland) reported that the inspector of the cemetery suspected a West Berliner had been
paid and ordered to commit the crime.38 The SED’s framing of these incidents as perpetrated by
Westerners, who were not only purportedly antisemitic but also anti-Communist, seems to have
influenced even Jewish citizens’ perception of antisemitic vandalism. Jalda Rebling, an actress
and regarded Yiddish folksinger who grew up in East Berlin, recalled in a 1988 interview with
Canadian sociologist Robin Ostow, “Every once in a while we would find a swastika painted on
our mailbox, but that was directed, naturally, at Jews and Communists—that was before 1961.”39
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The implication of the time period, Ostow notes in a footnote, was that Rebling believed the
vandals may have come over from the West since the Berlin Wall had not yet been built.40
Though the June 1959 desecration at Weissensee incident occurred in a different, deeper
stage of the Cold War that will be discussed more in depth in the following chapter, it hearkens
back to fears about negative press expressed in internal memos of the East Berlin Magistrat in
the early 1950s, as well. After “another” grave was vandalized on April 1, 1951, Siegmund
Weltlinger, the adviser for Jewish affairs in the Magistrat’s Office for Church Matters, asked the
Department to be vigilant and swift in its response, before the incident could be used as
“propaganda against our Magistrat.”41 This would not be the last time East Berlin officials took
action in response to an incident out of fear of negative attention in the Western press.
Like press coverage of antisemitic incidents on either side of the Iron Curtain, restitution
also became a tool in the context of the nascent Cold War. It was used to claim moral superiority,
measured in distance from the previous regime, over the other: in the Western zones because
they passed restitution laws first, and in the Eastern zone because it had abolished the capitalist
system that had allowed the exploitation of property in the first place. It was primarily internal
pressure that prompted the SED to reconsider a restitution law that would include Jewish
properties and recognize the victimhood of Jews alongside antifascist resistance fighters. But
mounting disagreements and an inability to compromise among the Four Powers erupted in 1948
and 1949, halting momentum for such a sweeping change of course and staving it off in the early
years of the DDR, until it was too late to turn back. However, the Gemeinde did not hopelessly
walk away from the devastating outcome for restitution, for reclaiming communal properties was
more than a matter of comfort or want. It was truly a matter of survival, requiring the Jewish
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community to find creative ways to use what it did have—the Weissensee cemetery—to
overcome the obstacles in its path.

The restitution debate
Since 1945, the SMAD had confiscated and nationalized private property and communal
property seized by the Nazi regime, including those previously owned by Jews.42 It had done so
our of a belief that the best way to crush the Nazi legacy was to eliminate all facets of capitalism,
the system Communists believed underpinned fascism. Moreover, the Communist leaders
resisted measures that recognized the particular suffering of the Jews and challenged the
hierarchy—with Communists as the primary enemies and victims of the Nazi regime, victims of
racial persecution as secondary—that legitimated the SED’s right to rule, though the party would
never admit it explicitly.43 On top of all this, the SED claimed it had paid reparations to those
who truly deserved it, who had saved Germans from further war and destruction: the Soviet
Union.44
Among the Western Allies, the United States was the biggest proponent of restitution
(Wiedergutmachtung in German, which literally translates to “making good again”) for Jewish
survivors. The U.S. military government issued a restitution law for its occupation zone in
November 1947, and the French passed one soon after for its zone of occupation. Though the
British supported restitution to Jewish victims, they did not pass a restitution measure for two
more years, preferring an “indirect rule” style of governance in which the German courts would
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hopefully decide the fate of stolen properties and, at the same time, wanting to maintain its
colonial hold over Palestine, which they feared they would lose if Jews used the money made
from selling returned property to emigrate there.45 In Berlin, where the Four Powers were
supposed to govern jointly, they butted heads and could not introduce a standard measure that
applied to all sectors of the city. The leaders in the Western sectors cooperated with international
Jewish organizations to push for the return of properties to Jewish survivors,46 while in the
Eastern sector, the 70 to 80 Jewish communal properties remained in the hands of the Soviets.
Within SED leadership, however, was Paul Merker, a Politburo member who had been a
vocal defender of Jews since his exile in Mexico City. During and after the war, Merker was
perhaps the most prominent critic of the majority view of such leading and dominant German
Communists as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, who opposed restitution. A longtime
member of the KPD, Merker fled Nazi Germany in 1937, first to France, then in 1942 to Mexico,
where he remained for the duration of the war and wrote extensively for the local Germanlanguage Communist newspaper Freies Deutschland. Upon his return to Germany in 1946 to
join the SED’s Central Committee and Politbüro, Merker could claim to have been an antifascist
resistance fighter and reap the benefits. Instead, he became one of the Jews’ most vocal
supporters in the upper echelons of the SED, unequivocally opposing the hierarchy created by
such leaders as Ulbricht and Pieck that placed Communists over Jewish victims of Nazi
persecution.
Along with Helmut Lehmann, the secretary of the Department of Labor and Social
Welfare of the Central Secretariat of the SED, Merker drafted a law for restitution in January
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1948 that would recognize the persecution of Jews and Communists as equal, eliminating the
distinction between “antifascist resistance fighters” and “victims of fascism.”47 Both “those
persons who, on the basis of democratic conviction, participated in the resistance against the
National Socialist state and were thereby subjected to persecution by the Nazi regime, as well as
those persons who were persecuted because of their religious views or as a result of Nazi racial
laws” would be eligible for a number of social welfare programs and pension benefits. It also
proposed a government commission that would create and execute a restitution policy that would
return property stolen by the Nazis for “reasons of race, religion, belief, or political opposition to
National Socialism” to its pre-1933 owners or, if necessary, to relatives.48 With the passage of
restitution laws already in the American and French occupation zones, Merker and Lehmann
urged the swift passage of their proposal.49 Instead, debates over the law lasted for nearly two
years before the SED passed any restitution legislation of its own.
At the same time that the SED leadership debated the limits of restitution, the SMAD
appeared to depart from its stance against restitution and passed Order Nr. 82, calling for the
return of properties confiscated by the Nazis to “democratic organizations,” a designation that
primarily applied to Communist groups. For reasons not entirely clear, however, the order also
allowed “church and humanitarian” institutions to recover their properties, provided the relevant
organizations submitted all requests for properties to be restituted within two months of the
order’s issue in April 1948.50 This proved all but impossible for most Jewish communities in the
SBZ, which lacked the organization and resources to file claims for all the properties stolen from
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them. In the largest of the organized Jewish communities in the SBZ (outside of Berlin), there
were at most several hundred members (Leipzig had 200 in 1945, 338 by 1949); in the smallest,
there were fewer than 50.51 Potsdam, for one, had just two surviving members in its Jewish
community after the Holocaust, and the Jewish association for the state of Brandenburg, where
Potsdam is located, was only able to reclaim four properties through Order Nr. 82.52 What is
more, the order had no power in Berlin, as the city was under joint quadripartite rule by the socalled Allied Kommandatura.
Hope for the Berlin Gemeinde came when, in December 1947, the Berlin city council
proposed a citywide law that would return Jewish property. In another unexpected departure
from Communist orthodoxy, the proposal came from the SED faction; one SED member of the
council gave a rousing endorsement of restitution as “the moral and political need to make
justice out of injustice.”53 By February 1948, the city council had passed a proposal for the law
and sent it to the Magistrat, which submitted a draft back to the city council to begin debating
that summer. The swiftness of the negotiations and sweeping nature of the proposed policy is
“difficult to grasp,” Michael Meng writes: “Local SED leaders were advocating here on behalf of
the Jews in a way that was largely unprecedented in Central Europe at the time.”54 For instance,
measures in the western zones of Germany were largely due to pressure from the U.S., and in
Poland, where antisemitic attacks were even more common than in Germany at the time,
Communist leaders argued that returning property to Jews would only exacerbate the violence.55
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However, the timing of the debate in the city council overlapped with the deepening of an
ideological rift between the Allied powers, which could ultimately derail the proposed restitution
law’s success. The multi-faceted joint governance of Berlin—between the Allied
Kommandatura, the Magistrat, and influence of the occupying military governments outside of
Berlin—was fraught from the beginning but began to show real signs of deterioration in 1947
and 1948: The Soviet representative to the Allied Kommandatura vetoed the election of SPD
member Ernst Reuter as mayor of Berlin because he was staunchly anti-Communist, and amid
rumors of a currency reform in the Western zones, the Soviets walked out of the Kommandatura
on June 16, 1948 and did not return. The Soviets had already walked out of the Allied Control
Council, which jointly governed the four sectors of Germany, three months earlier. When a
currency reform did occur overnight from June 23 to 24, 1948, the Soviets responded by
initiating a blockade of Berlin, an action that had already been planned but now had a clear
catalyst. The blockade halted discussions about a Berlin-wide restitution law in the Magistrat and
all but extinguished hopes of cooperative and collaborative governance in the Kommandatura.
The blockade of Berlin would last until May 12, 1949—during which time representatives from
the Western sectors of Berlin left the Magistrat; a mayor was elected for what was then,
informally, West Berlin; and the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
hereafter BRD) was established with the ratification of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) on May 8,
1949.56 It was a Grundgesetz because the Allies still hoped to reunify East and West, at which
point an official constitution (Verfassung) for the single German state would be written and
signed.
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The Soviets and the SED, however, had a different plan in mind. On October 5, 1949, the
SMAD passed the “Regulation for Securing the Legal Position of Those Recognized as
Persecuted by the Nazi Regime.” It was not Merker and Lehmann’s proposal, but rather the legal
validation of the moral hierarchy that placed Communist “fighters against fascism” above mostly
Jewish “victims,” that declared benefits would be distributed accordingly, with no provision for
returning stolen property to Jewish communities. On October 7, 1949, a group of delegates from
the SBZ announced plans to draft a constitution for the independent German Democratic
Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, hereafter DDR). The announcement explicitly
contrasted the DDR with the BRD, calling the drafting of a new constitution
the first step towards the restoration of [Germany’s] sovereignty, independence, and
freedom, while the undemocratic Germany at Bonn [the capital of the BRD], the rump
Germany of the war-mongers and the dividers (Spalter), of the Hitlerian armaments
magnates and large estate owners, continues in the hopeless perspective of enduring
occupation and economic dependence.57
The following day, the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic was adopted,
and, against the wished of the Western Allies, a second German state was born. Neither state
accepted the other’s claim that it was the sole representative of the German people
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch). The DDR denied that Germany could be represented by a capitalist
and, in their eyes, proto- or neo-fascist government. The BRD did not recognize the DDR as
legitimate because the Federal Republic was intended to only be a provisional state until the
division between East and West could be overcome.58 In the view of the West German
Parliament (Bundestag), no state could exist in East Germany, since the only German successor
state would be a united one—and, importantly, one not under Soviet control. This view was
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represented in a speech from the BRD’s first chancellor Konrad Adenauer given before the
Bundestag on October 21, 1949. “The Federal Republic of Germany is alone entitled to speak for
the German people,” proclaimed Adenauer. “It does not accept declarations from the Soviet zone
as binding for the German people.”59
Thus, by 1949, both the Western Allies’ hopes for a united Germany and the Jews’ hopes
for restitution of its confiscated properties seemed lost. As Jeffrey Herf put it, “The outcome of
the restitution debates between 1946 and 1950 was victory for those who believed that there was
‘no particular German responsibility toward the Jews,’ and that restitution was a term which
applied first of all to German obligations to the Soviet Union,” drawing the quoted claim—“no
particular German responsibility toward the Jews”—from an official DDR legislative newsletter
from 1950.60 The result was a law that underscored the moral superiority of “antifascist
resistance fighters” that the top SED leaders claimed, which in turn made them deserving of
political superiority and legitimated the founding of the German Democratic Republic, but in
reality mostly served to further drive the Four Powers away from one another. On the local level,
attempts from within the city council and government to return properties to Jewish survivors—
from SED representatives no less—demonstrated that the views of the very top of the party were
not hegemonic, but events on the national and international level derailed local officials’ work.
By the end of 1949, the face of the VVN had changed as well. Prominent Jewish
members of VVN, including Heinz Galinski, who had worked hard to reestablish the Berlin
Gemeinde, became frustrated that they were often the only ones defending their status as
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“victims of fascism” and resigned. 61 They left behind an increasingly Communist-dominated
organization in the place of one that was meant to represent the interests of all victims of the
Nazi regime.

Finding and losing agency
Any restitution law passed in the SBZ and DDR—whether it called for the return of
Jewish properties or not—had little effect on the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee, since it was
one piece of property that the Jewish community retained throughout the Nazi period and after
the war. That did not, however, mean that it was in pristine condition: Of the approximately
115,000 gravestones in the cemetery, approximately 4,000 were damaged by bombing raids
during the war, as were several buildings in the cemetery and part of the cemetery’s wall.62 As
mentioned above, at least a dozen more gravestones were damaged or vandalized in separate
incidents in the years following the war, most notably in 1947 and 1950.63 Restoring the
damaged graves, buildings, and wall would be nearly impossible for the Gemeinde on its own. In
1937, when there were still 140,000 Jews living in Berlin, the cemetery had 200 employees to
maintain the cemetery; in 1945, there were 7,000 Jews in Berlin, the majority of them elderly,
and twelve cemetery caretakers remaining.64 One author, writing in 1986, reflected on the state
of the cemetery at this time, with graves overturned and plants overgrown, “It seemed to be only
a matter of time before nature took back the terrain.”65
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The Gemeinde, however, did not permit nature to run its course. It used requests for
funding to repair the Weissensee cemetery, which enjoyed some degree of protection under the
ownership of the Gemeinde, as leverage to try to reclaim back pieces of seized property that the
Soviets had refused to return to them, as well as gain other forms of recognition of Jewish
victimhood at the hands of the Nazis.
On May 31, 1949, the board of the Gemeinde sent a letter to Deputy Mayor Arnold Gohr
to request funding for repairs to the cemetery and a few other expenses. The letter opens by
stating that the cemetery in Weissensee is in an “unbelievable condition,” followed by a survey
of the losses—“all of its assets through the actions of Nazi legislation”—and expenses the Jews
have faced in the past few years to “completely rebuild” itself.66 For these reasons, the board
wrote, the Gemeinde requested funds for several projects: First, 11,000 marks for the
reconstruction of the Weissensee cemetery wall that has been in part totally destroyed, allowing
“unhindered” access to the cemetery grounds. Rebuilding the wall would prevent more instances
of theft, vandalism, and desecration that the cemetery had already experienced. Second, the
Gemeinde requested that the Magistrat deploy and pay 100 workers for three months to restore
the cemetery’s damaged gravesites. Third, the Gemeinde requested 20,000 marks to build a
memorial to honor the Jewish victims of fascism on the grounds of the Weissensee cemetery, an
action it considered the duty of the Gemeinde, but one it could not afford alone. Despite all of its
efforts, the Gemeinde had not and still did not have the means to erect such a memorial, so it was
turning to the Magistrat, noting that in other German cities, local authorities had contributed
funds to create similar memorials.
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Following these requests for the Weissensee cemetery, the second half of the letter
featured a different set of requests: for the return of properties to the Gemeinde that were under
the administration of a citywide trust (Treuhandstelle) or of the Magistrat itself. The Gemeinde
leaders framed the request as an economically beneficial measure, since the properties were
being rented out by their respective administrators and the ability to do the same would make the
Gemeinde’s “activities” possible, without reliance on the government. The authors of the letter
also took the opportunity to remind the deputy mayor that these properties had once belonged to
the Jewish community or another Jewish organization. They then list over two dozen addresses
of properties that were “rented out and generate a substantial income,” or used by the police or
the “occupying power.”
The Gemeinde’s letter was forwarded to its intended recipient by Siegmund Weltlinger,
the adviser for Jewish affairs in the Magistrat’s Office for Church Matters. Weltlinger described
the content of the Gemeinde’s letter—the requests for funding to restore the cemetery wall and
build a memorial, and, “of even more importance,” the return of properties to be used for the
Gemeinde’s economic growth—and he offered commentary, encouraging the deputy mayor to
heed their requests.67 He reminded Gohr that in a meeting in February 1948, the Magistrat had
unanimously voted to provide 47,000 marks to the Gemeinde to subsidize repairs to the
Weissensee cemetery, but the Gemeinde never received them. “It would be therefore a special
benefit for the East Magistrat (Ostmagistrat) if this obligation were now fulfilled,” Weltlinger
wrote. About two months later, the Magistrat agreed to provide funds to the Gemeinde, up to
100,000 marks, to pay for the necessary reconstruction and restoration and for the erection of a
memorial.68 The memorial to the six million Jewish victims of fascist persecution was dedicated
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in April 1950 in the entrance to the Weissensee cemetery.69 The letter did not mention returning
any properties to the Gemeinde.
In the early years of the DDR, there was also a particularly lucrative partnership between
the Berlin Gemeinde and Otto Nuschke, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union and
director of the DDR’s Main Division for Church Liaison (Hauptabteilung Verbindung zu den
Kirchen) from 1949 to 1957. He was sympathetic to requests from the Gemeinde and often
offered funding to Jewish communities across the DDR when they had exhausted their
allotments, in excess of hundreds of thousands of marks in 1951 and 1952. He even appointed a
Jewish specialist, SED-member and Auschwitz survivor Albert Hirsch, to his office.70 To
construct a new synagogue in Erfurt, the first new synagogue in the DDR, Nuschke allocated
290,000 marks to the to the city’s community. The synagogue opened in 1952, several years after
the restitution debate had been settled in a manner unfavorable for the Jews. In a speech at the
synagogue’s opening ceremony, Nuschke made clear the political stance he was taking in
supporting the DDR’s Jewish communities: “But here in the DDR, a question of peace awaits its
answer: That is the question of compensating the Jews for the injustice carried out against
them.”71
What Nuschke did not know was that in just a few months, the injustice against the Jews
would be compounded by anti-Zionist purges carried out across the Eastern bloc, including in the
DDR. The Stalinization of Communist parties across the Soviet Union and Soviet areas of
influence prompted a campaign against “cosmopolitanism” that alleged international Jewish
organizations were “agencies of American imperialism” and by extension, that Jews who
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supported Israel were themselves agents of American imperialism.72 As another product of the
Cold War, East Germany had begun an anti-Zionist foreign policy that would last practically
until its demise.73
The first sign of the danger posed to Jews across the Eastern bloc was the removal of
Rudolf Slánský, a Jew, from his position as first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
in September 1951. He was accused of plotting with American imperialists against Communism
and was connected to Zionism. His persecution culminated in a show trial in Prague in
November 1952, in which thirteen other high-ranking Communist Party members—almost all of
them Jewish—were implicated and eleven of them sentenced to death.74 The SED, more
distrustful than ever, put out “Lessons from the Trial against the Slánský Conspiracy Center,” in
which it all but accused all Jews and those sympathetic to them of participating in the same antiCommunist conspiracy: “The SED cannot tolerate any more unexplained relationships.”75 In
“Lessons” the SED’s Central Committee specifically named Paul Merker, the non-Jewish coauthor of the restitution law that placed Jewish and Communist suffering under the Nazis on
equal footing, for his demonstrations of support for the Jews of Germany during and after the
war. Merker was arrested on December 4 and was purged from the SED.76
The following months were disastrous for the Jews of East Berlin and the DDR.
Hundreds of Jews fled to the West, fearing arrest and persecution. With the threat of sanction by
the SED, Jewish leaders and defenders of their interests were among them, including Julius
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Meyer, the chairman of the State Association of Jewish Communities, and Leon Löwenkopf,
who lead the Dresden Jewish community. The Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin split between East
and West in December 1952, due to internal divisions about the meaning of Jewishness
exacerbated by the Stalinist purges, which forced Communists of Jewish descent to choose
between identities.77 What limited autonomy the Gemeinde had gained before 1953 was lost in
its disorganization and dwindling membership. To add insult to injury, the VVN was replaced in
1953 with the Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters (Komitee der Antifaschistichen
Widerstandskämpfer, hereafter KdAW), leaving no question of the SED’s priorities.
Sporadic instances of support for the Jews of East Berlin between 1945 and 1953 were
overshadowed by an underlying refusal to acknowledge the victimhood of Jews during the Nazi
regime and, by extension, the necessity of material restitution. The Weissensee cemetery is
perhaps an exception to this rule, and the Gemeinde smartly used its dilapidated state to try to
reclaim other properties it had lost. But, as had happened several times during this period, any
gains were interrupted or halted altogether due to the playing out of international conflicts of the
Cold War on a local level. And in the case of the 1952-1953 antisemitic purges, the Jews in the
DDR would struggle to recover for the next four decades.
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Chapter 2: Myths
After the Stalinist anti-cosmopolitan purges of 1953, and the death of Stalin himself in
March of that year, the SED’s focus returned to its primary project: establishing a socialist
German state. During the turbulent immediate postwar years, the Western Allies and eventually
West Germany denied an East German state legitimacy, and even East Germans did not seem to
fully trust the ability of the SED to lead: widespread protests of the party across the German
Democratic Republic in summer 1953 were ultimately put down with Soviet tanks, further
damaging the SED’s claim to power. What was a young country, with a different country
claiming to be the only legitimate German state right next door, to do? Similarly, the weakened
Jewish community in East Germany faced a turning point: would it resign to being recognized as
‘lesser’ victims? Would Jewish Communists reject or hide the part of their identity that in 1953
may have put them in great danger of persecution?
Standard definitions of “legitimacy” in a political context all sound somewhat similar: “a
political order’s worthiness to be recognized,” or “The acceptability or appropriateness of a ruler
or political regime to its members.”1 In the case of a “revolutionary regime” like the SED
claimed to be, legitimacy is derived from ideology; the people supported the ideology enough to
spark a revolution to overturn the previous regime. In order to hold on to power, however, the
regime must reassure its people of its enduring commitment to the revolutionary ideology.2 In
contrast to a totalitarian regime, where legitimacy is created by force, a revolutionary regime
must win, and keep, the favor of the people through persuasion and belief. For this reason, Alan
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Nothnagle argues that myths were an effective tool for creating the SED’s legitimacy. Nothnagle
defines myths as “events, processes, or persons from an earlier time, which, typically estranged
from their original meanings and contexts, transmit religious and ideological beliefs to a
specified group in an easily comprehended, emotionally moving form.”3 Nothnagle’s assertion
begs the question: What narrative did the SED tell its citizens to lay claim to the German
Democratic Republic, to a sovereign German state at all?
I am not claiming, nor does Nothnagle’s definition of myth argue, that myths are not
based in fact. Rather, a myth-building revolutionary regime tends to highlight or perhaps
exaggerate certain parts of history for emotional effect and toward ideological ends. This was the
case in the DDR, where the foundational myth was that the East German state was comprised of
antifascist resistance fighters who, along with aid from Soviet allies, defeated the Nazi regime,
the final iteration of the socialist movement in Germany. While this core of the SED’s myth
remained constant throughout its existence, the part of the myth that placed the DDR in all of
German history evolved. The regime chose to feature figures and events of German history as
heroes and victories of the socialist movement in Germany, and thus predecessors to the SED, to
further claim legitimacy as a German state.
This chapter focuses on the visual and material representations and cultural tools of the
SED’s myth-building, demonstrated in the creation of monuments and in the practice of historic
preservation until the early 1960s. Building off Rudy Koshar’s assertion that “Old buildings have
mattered in national memory work” and that one goal of creating national memory is the creation
of a shared national identity,4 I find that the DDR’s founding myth was a form of national
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memory work that excluded those citizens who did not fully support the myth, which in turn was
reflected in the sites deemed worthy of commemoration or preservation as monuments. The body
that oversaw the creation of memorials and the maintenance of historic sites in the DDR was,
after 1952, the Institute for Historic Preservation (Institut fur Denkmalpflege, hereafter IfD).
Though the IfD’s productivity was frequently stymied by internal disorder, loopholes in
preservation rules, and ideological tensions between conservationists, it is nonetheless
worthwhile to consider the content of its guidelines. The guidelines reveal the SED’s priorities
and the ways it used preservation to perpetuate its myth and claim legitimacy.
Absent from the guidelines were any Jewish sites, as being unambiguously “Jewish” was
not part of the shared East German identity. The Jews who upheld the ‘antifascist resistance’
myth could be incorporated into the shared identity and lauded as antifascist resistance fighters
themselves. But the Jewish East Germans who questioned the myth because it glossed over the
victimhood and resistance of others during the Nazi regime, including the racially persecuted,
were accused by the SED of harboring sympathies with Israel and the West. Such an accusation
in the midst of the Cold War was arguably an ideological one, but when directed at a Jew it
demonstrated belief in antisemitic tropes, vestiges of the period of anti-cosmopolitan purges.
In the first portion of this chapter, in which I discuss the formulation of the SED’s
historic preservation policies, the voices and story of the Jews are largely absent. This is not by
design but by circumstance; it underscores the SED’s tendency to exclude Jews from
conversations that the SED believed did not concern them, including conversations about
preservation of significant historical sites. It would take at least another decade and significant
developments in the Cold War to change the SED’s mind. Until it did, Jews both in the DDR and
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outside of its borders continued to seek out ways to claim agency and deliver demands of
recognition and assistance to the SED.
There were two forms of legitimacy, connected but not exactly the same, that the regime
sought: the first was legitimacy in its own right, as a German state that succeeded everything
positive and progressive in German history. This legitimacy would be created through the
portrayal of a narrative of antifascist resistance as the pinnacle of socialism in Germany. The
second was legitimacy relative to West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany, which, the
SED claimed, continued the legacy of the Nazi regime and thus was not legitimate. The first
implied the second, but the SED used slightly different tactics in claiming them. The party
involved the Jewish community directly when it had to draw a distinction from West Germany,
but not in its construction of the antifascist resistance myth. It was this double standard of sorts
that sparked outcry among Jews, and the SED’s response revealed the enduring influence of
antisemitism.

Upheaval and (re)construction
Claiming it was the antithesis of the previous fascist regime, the SED first needed to
create as much distance between it and the Nazis. This was accomplished through the veneration
of antifascist resistance fighters and an alliance with the Soviets, as well as through
denazification that resulted in the punishment of tens of thousands of former Nazi party
members. In this phase of “Antifascist-Democratic Upheaval,” physical evidence of the Nazi
past on the landscape of East Germany also had to be destroyed.5 Reflecting on this period,
former DDR conservationist Ludwig Deiters wrote that “at the forefront of the [DDR’s]
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ideological thinking and practical behavior was the will to break with the political history, to
change societal relations.”6
The case of the Berliner Stadtschloss represents one example of this “ideological
thinking” in action. The Berliner Stadtschloss, the home of kings and emperors from the fifteenth
century through the end of World War I, was heavily damaged by Allied bombing raids, but
repairs were still possible to preserve the palace. However, apparently due to a decision made
solely by SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, the Stadtschloss was to be demolished. Deiters
explained the decision as a conscious effort to destroy ties to Germany’s feudalist history, 7
though local officials at the time claimed that it was because the damage—caused by the actions
of the Allies alone—was too great.8 Easterners and Westerners alike protested the decision,
especially art historians and conservationists, though those who defended the palace’s continued
cultural significance were considered conservative and bourgeois. Among preservationists in the
DDR a particular schism emerged between Gerhard Strauss, a backer (at least publicly) of the
SED’s vision for a socialist reconstruction, and Wolfgang Schubert, a vehement defender of the
traditions of historic preservation.9 Schubert was one among several prominent figures in the
world of German art history and preservation to protest the planned demolition of the
Stadtschloss. Nonetheless, Ulbricht’s decision stood. In the place of the Stadtschloss, he
envisioned “a grand square for demonstrations, upon which our people’s will for struggle and for
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progress can find expression.”10 Over two decades later the Palast der Republik, the home of the
largely symbolic East German parliament the Volkskammer, would be built in its place.11
The disagreement over the fate of the Berliner Stadtschloss was just one example of
conflict among conservationists, conflicts that pervaded and led to differences in the practice of
historic preservation. In fact, in the 1950s and 1960s historic preservation had no backing in law
and thus no legal enforcement if guidelines set out by the SED went unheeded; individual
conservationists pretty much had free reign to protect what they wanted to keep and demolish
what they did not.12 All the while Cold War tensions lingered in the background, exerting an
influence on the story the DDR told about itself and its appearance in the landscape of East
Berlin.
The DDR’s first official declaration of standards for preservation of historical and
cultural sites came on July 26, 1952 with the “Verordnung zur Erhaltung und Pflege der
nationalen Kulturdenkmale.” Surprisingly, the ordinance did not define the term “memorial”
(Denkmal) in explicitly political or ideological terms: “Memorial, in the way it is used in this
ordinance, are all characteristic evidence [alle charakteristischen Zeugnissen] of cultural
development of our people, the preservation of which is in the interest of the public due to their
artistic, scientific, or historical significance.”13 The ideological motivation behind the ordinance
is implied in the evocation of “our people,” for whom the protected sites stand and whose
interests are at the heart of the socialist state. The preamble of the ordinance states,
The cultural heritage of the German people comprises precious works of art that,
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through their beauty and authenticity, is evidence of the creative power of the masses.
To keep and preserve this heritage and make it accessible to the wide masses of our
people is one of the most important duties of the government of the German
Democratic Republic. The acquisition of this cultural heritage is the concern of the
whole population, which opposes all attempts of malicious or negligent destruction of
cultural memorials with the severity of the law.14
In December 1952, the Institute for Historic Preservation (Institut für Denkmalpflege,
hereafter IfD) was established, replacing independent regional and local offices with a
centralized one to create standard preservation guidelines. The IfD was created as a subsidiary of
the Ministry for Culture, and its ideological function was made explicit in planning documents:
“The tasks of the Institute include … establishing basic principles that ensure the development of
monuments for the patriotic education of the German people … contributing to the creation of
new monuments recognizing the history of the German workers’ movement and of the German
people.”15
The IfD, however, was officially a research institution and not a governmental agency
with oversight over the business of historic preservation; it did not have legal power to enforce
the 1952 Verordnung, and individual conservationists retained significant power. This meant that
opponents of the regime could intentionally ignore ideological declarations without legal
consequences. The most obvious case in this regard was that of Wolfgang Schubert, the
conservationist who led the defense of the Berliner Stadtschloss in 1950, who time and again
prevailed over the SED’s efforts to force party-line adherence in the practice of historic
preservation. He was bourgeois and a serious Protestant who was described by the Ministry for
Culture at one point as representing a “reactionary standpoint…[that] was a pure denial of the
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demands of the state apparatus.”16 The Ministry for Culture passed measures to attempt to
control conservationists, such as one from November 1955 that demanded all IfD employees
“contribute to the strengthening of the German Democratic Republic” (through, among other
actions, dedicating special attention to national monuments to the German workers’ movement
and antifascist resistance fighters, “in accordance to their great political significance”).17 Despite
these measures, figures like Schubert who did not follow them were not forced out of their
positions; Schubert became, in fact, one of the leading and most productive historic
preservationists in the DDR. Schubert’s influence on the field could explain why Ludwig
Deiters, the former IfD employee, remarked that he was surprised by the broad definition given
to “monument”: Monuments to “the history of the German workers’ movement and of the
German people” apparently encompassed so-called “technical” monuments to the history of
technology that changed the nature of the workers’ movement, as well as churches and
cemeteries, gardens and parks, and theaters.18
In any case, it became less important that not all conservationists were loyal SED
supporters, since in the early 1950s the party began to embrace, as Alan Nothnagle argues, “all
those figures in German history who, regardless of their own class status had contributed to the
strengthening and unification of the German people” through their contributions to art, science,
and technology.19 The SED adopted this new strategy to portray a more inclusive history of the
DDR, one that traced back centuries and generations rather than merely decades. The course of

16

“Bericht über den Brigadeeinsatz vom 18.-23.6.1958 beim Institut für Denkmalpflege Halle,” cited in Campbell,
“Resurrected from the Ruins, Turning to the Past,” 92.
17
“Protokoll über die am 23. November 1955 durchgeführte öffentliche Parteiversammlung im Institut für
Denkmalpflege,” cited in Schumacher-Lange, “Denkmalpflege und Repräsentationskultur in der DDR,” 43.
18
Deiters, “Das Institut für Denkmalpflege in der DDR – Erinnerungen und Reflexionen,” in Denkmalpflege in der
DDR, ed. Jörg Haspel and Hubert Staroste, 17.
19
Nothnagle, “From Buchenwald to Bismarck,” 95, 102. The strategy originated with Albert Norden’s Kampf um
die Nation, a sort of treatise from a prominent (and also Jewish) SED member on how to interpret German history.
Albert Norden, Kampf um die Nation: Beiträge zur Deutschlands Lebensfrage (Berlin: Dietz, 1953).

50

this history was questionable and at times awkward, but with it the SED thought it could more
easily claim that the DDR was the true German state—a state that represented and celebrated all
the progressive and positive aspects about the course of German history. The Third Reich had
been an aberration, and West Germany an unfortunate continuation of that regime, but the SED
maintained that the German tradition still had a worthy successor state in East Germany.
Trying to create a coherent narrative of progressive politics while brushing over
militarism, imperialism, and fascism sometimes led to what Nothnagle calls “retrograde mythbuilding”: the appropriation of historical figures and sites that did not have any clear ties to the
workers’ movement, antifascist resistance, or socialism into the SED’s myth.20 From musicians
and composers to literary giants21—and even Otto von Bismarck, the military leader who
forcefully united the 26 German states in 1871—symbols of a united Germany and its
contributions to the world were awkwardly incorporated into the story of socialism’s
development in Germany.
Moreover, the SED used the evocation of such (inter)national heroes to call for the
reunification of Germany under a socialist regime. Physical symbols of peace and reconciliation,
such as the Brandenburger Tor, were restored and rededicated as a reminder of past German
unity.22 But as East and West both became more entrenched on opposite sides of the Cold War,
and the Federal Republic enacted the Hallstein Doctrine in 1955 to formally deny international
recognition to the DDR, the probability of compromise and consensus shrank to zero.
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If international legitimacy was not yet achievable, the SED nonetheless endeavored to
earn the trust and admiration of its people. A patriotic, nationalistic celebration of German
artists, inventors, writers, and more was thought to arouse more enthusiasm for the state than the
short-lived strategy of destruction. In addition to honoring a wider array of figures in German
history, the 1952 Verordnung aimed to involve the people by making them feel as if they had a
stake in preserving it—making historic preservation “the concern of the whole population.”
The SED thought it could use cultural production to inspire East Germans. In 1950, the
DDR’s first Five-Year Plan for the economy outlined an expansion of heavy industry and
agriculture, but it also demanded the party focus on the country’s cultural output and
consumption as a metric of economic growth and overall strength of socialism.23 SED General
Secretary Walter Ulbricht reported at the SED’s Third Party Conference in March 1956 that the
state had increased spending on culture every year during the first Five-Year Plan—nearly
doubling annual expenditures over the five years, from 1.7 billion marks in 1951 to 3.2 billion
marks in 1955—to spend a total of 12.6 billion marks on culture. With the next five years in
mind, Ulbricht committed to even greater cultural development in the DDR: “The crucial task in
the second Five-Year Plan lies in developing a Socialist culture in the German Democratic
Republic and transmitting it to the entire nation.”24
Buy any regime must deliver on its promises and fulfill the needs of its people to retain
its power.25 The DDR struggled to boost its planned economy from the beginning, and the
country would continue to face solvency issues for basically the entirety of its existence. Nearly
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3.5 million East Germans fled to the West in the 1950s for economic and political reasons. A
November 1960 report from Central Committee of the SED on the particular Republikflucht of
young people, expressed concern that “some young people evidently leave the republic because
they do not regard our accounts of the Fascist, militaristic development of West Germany as
credible” because they had had too much exposure to the Western narrative.26 Preferring to focus
on the ideological and rhetorical rather than the practical, the SED believed reversing the neglect
of “political-ideological work” among young people could reverse the negative trend.
But in August 1961, the East German leadership took dramatic action to keep the
negative Western views on the East out—literally. A wall dividing Berlin and surrounding the
western sector, cutting it off from its East German surroundings and limiting access back West,
appeared practically overnight. The erection of the Berlin Wall marked a zenith of East German
insecurities about its legitimacy in the Cold War, though the SED would not admit it. Instead, the
regime claimed it built the “Antifascist Protection Wall” to keep out the degenerate effects of
capitalism and the remnants of fascism in the West on the East, where true German tradition
resided.27
Erecting the Berlin Wall squashed any lingering chances of reunification and also meant
the SED would have to abandon its strategy calling for unity. A new ordinance on historic
preservation passed on September 28, 1961 articulated the necessity of a particularly socialist
nationalism. “It is necessary to develop a clear conception of the meaning and duties of historic
preservation that must extend from the Marxist-Leninist analysis of history and recognize the
values forged by the working people of the past generations and give an outstanding image of
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their artistic and technical abilities,” reads notes from one meeting of the national Ministry of
Culture’s Department of Historic Preservation.28 Refocusing, again, on parts of the German past
that were clearly connected to the development of socialism as the SED’s method to legitimize
itself would endure into the next decade, when Cold War developments would prompt the SED
to adjust its course yet again.

Inconvenient victims become vocal critics
In 1953, in the period of de-Stalinization of the SED following the anti-cosmopolitan
purges and after the split of the East and West Berlin Jewish communities, it appeared as though
the relationship between the SED and East German Jews had been repaired and the regime had
changed its mind about the victimhood of the Jews. The East Berlin Gemeinde began receiving
support from the state and local governments again, such as in the form of 300,000 marks to
rebuild one of its synagogues, at a time when the Gemeinde had only approximately 50,000
marks in its account.29 With help from Otto Nuschke of the Main Division for Church Liaison, a
memorial to the six million Jewish victims of fascism was designed for the Jewish cemetery in
Weissensee. Furthermore, in a report of the memorial’s unveiling in October 1953 in Neue Zeit
—the official newspaper of the Christian Democrats, the only major East German newspaper to
cover the ceremony—there was surprisingly no comparison drawn between East and West
Berlin, no mention of the supposedly resurgent antisemitism in the West. Rather, the quoted
speeches focused on the duty of all antifascists and German patriots to prevent the rebirth of
fascism.30
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But this recognition did not last long. The SED’s treatment of the Jews of East Berlin was
characterized by selective appreciation, but also wariness. As Marianne Krüger-Potratz puts it in
her study of minority populations in the DDR, Jews were “sometimes considered suspicious as
‘Zionists,’ sometimes privileged as ‘antifascists.’”31 To that end, Mario Kessler adds, those
privileges, if Jews had them, were awarded based on participation in resistance fighting, rather
than on persecution because of their Jewish identity.32 Jewish identity alone in the DDR was
neither the source of privilege, nor of protection.
Recognition of the significance of Jewish sites in the DDR—and when it rarely
happened, preservation of them—was inconvenient unless it fit into a narrative of antifascist
resistance or served to draw a positive contrast with the BRD. As noted in the previous section,
the SED’s narrative of German history was constantly changing and shifting through the 1950s
and into the 1960s based on political tact, but there was one consistency: Jewish history was not
part of the story, and as a result its physical remnants were mostly deemed unworthy of
restoration or protection by even toothless declarations of preservation standards. Erasure of
Jewish sites and the Jewish past was not unique to the East German case,33 but deviation from
that practice and press coverage thereof demonstrate the extent to which the SED would
politically exploit Jewish matters for its own claim to legitimacy.
The case of Herbert Baum presents an example of the SED using a figure, both Jewish
and Communist, to corroborate the narrative of antifascist resistance. Baum and his wife
Marianne became leaders of a Jewish youth group in Berlin, before joining the Communist
31
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Youth Association of Germany in 1934. Working in both organizations, they attempted to
assemble a united front of Jewish and Communist youth to oppose the Nazi regime, in
connection with the underground KPD. Straddling two groups and identities, however, was not
easy. One author described Baum’s group as facing “double isolation”: it was not fully integrated
into the KPD because its members were Jewish, but it was also not accepted by the Jewish
community because its members were Communist.34
In 1941, Baum and his wife were forced into work in a Nazi armament factory, where
they recruited even more supporters among the other forced laborers.35 The oldest member was
40, the youngest 19. The group called itself the Baum Group and started illegally printing
antifascist flyers and newspapers in the basement of Baum’s apartment building and planning an
attack—a demonstration of resistance—on a Nazi public demonstration that would take place on
May 2, 1942. On the day of the demonstration, Baum and the 27 other members of his group
were arrested and executed; afterward, in a retaliatory show of force against the Jewish leaders of
the attack, five hundred more Jews were arrested, 250 of them shot and 250 of them sent to a
concentration camp.36
Baum was originally buried in the cemetery in the Berlin neighborhood of Marzahn,
which features several memorial stones to political prisoners and forced laborers during the Nazi
regime, to Communist revolutionaries and Red Army soldiers. His corpse was moved to the
Jewish cemetery in Weissensee in 1949, where nine years later a memorial was erected (it is not
clear by whose initiative).37 The front of the memorial gravestone, below Baum’s name, reads,
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“He was an exemplary fighter against war and fascism.” On the back is a list of the 27 members
of his group arrested and executed and their ages at the time of their deaths, and below their
name reads, “They fell in the fight for peace and freedom.”
Despite the change in location—from a Communist cemetery to a Jewish cemetery—
press coverage of the creation of the memorial chose to highlight Baum’s antifascist credentials
over his Jewish heritage. A Berliner Zeitung article about the memorial does not reference
Baum’s religion or that of the other members of his group. In a particularly ignorant statement,
the author claimed that the group was motivated by a desire “to show the world that not all
Germans had fallen victim to fascist propaganda”; as if these Jewish activists had had an option
to reject the propaganda that portrayed them as public enemy number one! The author lauded
Baum and his allies as heroes, rather than merely victims, hearkening back to the debate of the
previous decade. Illegal printing, planning a bombing raid: “that’s how the persecuted became
fighters,” the article states.
In the final paragraph of the article, the author reiterates the moral superiority of the
Baum Group because they did not just suffer; they fought back:
But fascism and the war it caused also destroyed the life of millions of people, who never
stood up against the Brown Barbarism. They died a meaningless death from bombs, on
the front, because, unlike Herbert Baum and his comrades, they did not recognize the
simple truth, that, he who wants to live in peace must risk his life for it.38
The SED’s reasons for memorializing Baum were starkly different from the reasons it
appeared to show concern for the Weissensee cemetery as a whole. When preservation efforts
did occur there, they were made to exemplify the distinction between the antifascist East, where
antisemitism had supposedly been totally wiped out, and West, where, the SED argued, Nazis
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remained and posed an active threat to Jews. “At a time when the old SS officers in West
Germany want to be left to command the youth again,” a Neue Zeit article from October 1956
reported, a local provost called upon young East Berliners to spend one Sunday cleaning up the
“rather neglected part” of the Weissensee Jewish cemetery, in order to “ensure that visible
remnants of the SS command” were removed. This action proved that, in the DDR at least, the
“spirit of the Nazi dictatorship had successfully been broken.”39 In contrast to Baum, an agent of
change who stood up for himself, Jews, dead and alive, were simply victims in need of East
German assistance and protection.
When reporting on instances of antisemitism in West Berlin, the East German press often
went to Rabbi Martin Riesenburger of the East Berlin Gemeinde for commentary. He had
survived the war in Berlin due to his marriage to a Christian woman and led secret services and
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conducted religious burial services throughout the war, but his demonstrations of resistance
during the Nazi regime were not often a point of emphasis. Instead, he was frequently featured
because he could be counted on to criticize West Germany in these instances. For this reason he
was often disparaged in the West as “the Red Rabbi,” though he was never officially a
Communist.40
An example of Riesenburger’s commentary can be found in a piece that appeared in Neue
Zeit on July 24, 1963. The author of the article visits the Weissensee cemetery with
Riesenburger, who tells of the 809 gravestones for Jews killed in Auschwitz, Ravensbrück, and
Neuengamme, “only a fraction of the immeasurable suffering that left millions of Jews
condemned to death during the Hitler dictatorship.” The moving description and tribute to an
enduring symbol of Jewish history, in a city that had so few such symbols left, becomes in the
last paragraph a political statement on the recent indictment of Hans Globke, the chief of staff of
the West German Chancellery. As a lawyer in the Nazi regime, he had not objected to the
Nuremberg Laws and thus facilitated the Holocaust. As parting words for the journalist in the
Weissensee cemetery, Riesenburger reportedly said, “The decision has been handed down. It is
now up to the people in West Germany to wake up and concur” with this decision.41
As if to convince its members of the unique protection provided in the DDR, SED
politicians reminded the Jewish community of ‘resurgent’ antisemitism in the West in direct
correspondence. In a letter to the national Association of Jewish Communities in the DDR
(Verband der jüdischen Gemeinden in der DDR, hereafter Verband), the secretary for church
liaison expressed a feeling of kinship with the Jews of East Germany, who “can appreciate the
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politics of peace in our workers’ and peasants’ state” because of “their pitiful past in the Nazi
era.” He then reiterated the DDR’s commitment to seeking peace and overcoming the protofascist traits that had come to define the Federal Republic—“militarism, revanchism, racial
agitation, and the associated danger of war”—like dozens of East German officials had before.42
As in the other examples, contrast with the West betrays the SED’s political motivation in
actions that otherwise could honor the memory of Jews and recognize the importance of
preserving their history.
For the most part, however, the Jewish community expressed support for the SED. This
was a survival strategy: only through loyalty could Jews hope to receive the support they needed
to maintain their properties and provide necessary services to members as much as possible.
Prior to parliamentary elections across the DDR in October 1963, the Verband endorsed the
SED-controlled National Front as the party that would “guarantee that there would never be
another Kristallnacht.” This statement was particularly timely, as November 9, 1963 would mark
the 25th anniversary of the Nazis’ attacks on Jewish properties of November 1938. The
endorsement, moreover, implied a sort of quid pro quo, which the Verband summarized with the
slogan “The Republic needs all—everyone needs the Republic.”43 The Jews would do their part
to strengthen the state because they had to in order to survive, but they also asked for a guarantee
of support in return.
There was thus a double standard for Jews in the DDR: their sites were rarely recognized
as both Jewish and antifascist, more often only recognized because of a politically favorable
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comparison to be drawn with the West, and many Jewish citizens did not feel comfortable
accusing the SED of unfair treatment because they relied on the party’s support. There were
other Jews, however, who were not constrained by the needs—even desperation—of the East
German Jewish community because they were communists and supporters of the regime, or
because they were not even East German. They occupied a position of privilege that allowed
them to speak out against the SED’s treatment of Jews and protected them from backlash. In the
1950s, one catalyst for such protest was the creation of a new museum and memorial to
antifascist resistance fighters, but not to Jewish prisoners, at the former Buchenwald
concentration camp. As a site that did receive attention and acknowledgement as significant in
DDR history, Buchenwald serves as a counterexample to Jewish sites such as the Weissensee
cemetery, which as a whole did not have memorial status at this point. The former camp and site
of rebellion embodied the aspects of history that the SED deemed worthy of veneration and its
elevated stature in history allows reflection on what, in the SED’s view, Weissensee apparently
lacked. Examining the critiques waged on the Buchenwald memorial, however, shows that the
SED’s view was not the definitive one, despite its attempts to make it so.
Buchenwald, located near the city of Weimar, was not known for its remarkable death
toll (about 56,000 people were murdered or died of starvation, disease, or exposure there), but
rather was renowned for the “fundamental, nearly mythological role” it played in the
construction of the East German history of an antifascist resistance that took down the Nazis.44 A
clandestine group formed among the prisoners of the camp, the great majority of whom were
Communist political prisoners, called the International Camp Committee, which secretly
gathered weapons and planned attacks on a nearby armaments factory. The committee’s most
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famous, if exaggerated, act of resistance occurred on April 11, 1945, when the remaining
members of the committee revolted against the remaining SS officers. It was remembered as an
act of a self-liberation, though many SS officers had already fled by that point, anticipating the
arrival of American troops only hours later. To add to the mythical quality of the camp, Ernst
Thälmann, the leaders of the KPD between 1925 and 1933 and a hero of the antifascist
movement as the founder of Antifaschistische Aktion (Antifa), was murdered in Buchenwald in
August 1944.45 The “self-liberation” at Buchenwald was among the most important events in the
legitimation of the East German historic narrative, and it was commemorated with a monument,
dedicated in September 1958, that highlighted the heroic, specifically Communist-led triumph
over fascism, rather than the tragic murder of thousands or resistance by any other group.
To be sure, until late 1943 and early 1944, the camp was overwhelmingly a camp made
up of political opponents to the Nazi regime. This was likely because, as James Young points
out, most Jews were by late 1943 being deported directly to death camps rather than
concentration camps. Young also notes, however, the composition of Buchenwald changed
dramatically between then and liberation in 1945, with not only the arrival of thousands of “halfdead Jews” from abandoned death camps further east but also French prisoners and 8,000 Soviet
POWs who were shot immediately upon arrival.46 These newly arrived Jews and others were
segregated from the main camp and not incorporated into the International Camp Committee and
its resistance organization.
The memorial, commissioned by the government in 1951, covers over three million
square-feet in total. It features a zig-zagging path called the “Street of the Nations,” which is
lined with large stone blocks with the names of the countries from which prisoners came. The
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path leads up a hill to the piece de resistance, literally: a bronze sculpture of eleven resistance
fighters, all men,47 backed by a 160-foot tall bell tower, both overlooking the surrounding
Thuringian landscape. One of the men depicted in the sculpture raises his right hand in the “Oath
of Buchenwald,” a speech purportedly given at a memorial ceremony a few days after liberation.
It reads, in part, “The extermination of Nazism with its roots is our slogan. The building of a new
world of peace and freedom is out goal. We owe this to our murdered comrades and their
families.”48 The evocation of this speech through the sculpture highlights the degree to which the
myth had pervaded DDR consciousness.
The absence of any mention of Jewish prisoners in the camp was auspicious to Jewish
visitors. Felix Bergmann initiated contact with Otto Grotewohl, the prime minister of the DDR,
in September 1960, following a summer visit to Buchenwald. He was born in Germany but had
emigrated to Palestine and was at the time a professor at the Hebrew University medical school
in Jerusalem. Bergmann took issue with the “Street of the Nations” in particular, which did not
mention Jews. “Was it not enough for thousands of Jews to be murdered in Buchenwald, and for
millions more to be suffocated in gas chambers, in order for my people to get a place among all
the nations who lost their sons?” Bergmann wrote.49 The correspondence was taken up by Georg
Spielmann, the leader of the Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters, a government
agency, who replied that the Street of the Nations honored all those deported and murdered in
Buchenwald, “regardless of race, religion, or ideology.”50 To that, Bergmann replied, even more
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vehemently,
The Jews came to the camps as ‘Jews,’ i.e. as members of the Jewish people, and they
were therefore placed in a special camp within the camps, separated from the ‘Aryans’
from all other countries, tormented with especially bestial methods and especially small
rations. … It is really a mockery of my people if you now declare that the 'Jews were
dragged into the camps and exterminated as Polish, Russian, Hungarian ... German
citizens'. At that time, none of these peoples brought up our citizenship rights.51
Bergmann delivered a searing indictment of the DDR if it did not correct its course. “This
moment is very important for the DDR, much more important than for the Jews, because we will
survive without the memorial stone in Buchenwald. We have survived German fascism, and we
are preparing to outlast the DDR, too.”
Possibly in reaction to Bergmann’s lambasting, the Committee of Antifascist Resistance
Fighters joined forces with the Union of Israeli Antifascist Fighters and decided to incorporate
the story of the Jewish prisoners into a memorial to be erected at the Sachsenhausen
concentration camp outside Berlin. Jews’ experiences would have to be featured in this new
memorial, SED politician (and Communist Jew himself) Albert Norden wrote to Spielmann in
March 1961 because, if not, “then you are encouraging those hostile slanders that have already
been raised more than once in public, that in the DDR the suffering of the Jews under Hitler’s
fascism has not received sufficient attention.”52
While Bergmann’s protests of the memorial were met with swift action, the SED reacted
differently when faced with a critique from one of its constituents. Arnold Zweig, a Jewish
author who proclaimed pacifist and socialist beliefs, questioned the absence of “the ancient
symbol of the Star of David that would have represented the Jewish victims of the fascist terror”
at Buchenwald.53 In response, the SED called Zweig a “known Zionist” and did not engage in
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conversation. On several counts, Zweig was an ‘antifascist,’ an opponent of the Nazi regime and
a supporter of the East German socialist project: Before he fled to Palestine in 1933, he had been
a co-editor of Die Weltbühne, an influential cultural publication with leftist, eventually
antifascist, leanings. His books were burned by the Nazis. He was even personally invited to
return to the DDR in 1948, a fortunate turn of events as he no longer felt at home in Israel and
did not consider himself a Zionist anymore.
What can explain Zweig’s dismissal as a Zionist, the dismissal of his critique as simply
motivated by sympathy with Israel, when his grievances about the Buchenwald memorial were
much less reproachful (and persistent) than Bergmann’s? The SED had used the term—
“Zionist”—disparagingly against Jews before, famously against historian Helmut Eschwege,
who was dismissed from the SED in 1953 for labeling his nationality as “Jewish” rather than
“German” on official documents.54 Calling a Jew a “Zionist” conveyed disloyalty to the DDR,
whose staunchly anti-Israel foreign policy stance was well known; in light of Israel’s alliance
with the United States, the Jewish state was viewed in the DDR as simply an agent of American
imperialism.55 But the term also had embedded in it much more nefarious implications of belief
in a Jewish conspiracy. It carried with it, too, the memory of the Stalinist purges of 1953 and the
threat of persecution, which was sufficient to silence complaints.
The SED was responsive when criticism came from a Jew outside of the DDR, speaking
to the external perception of the regime, but not when it came from within. It was simpler to
discredit Zweig’s view as that of a “known Zionist” intent on undermining the anti-Zionist SED
than it was to explain the paradox of victimhood and resistance represented in the Buchenwald
memorial, or, for that matter, to justify the inconsistent treatment of Jewish sites in general. To
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do so would reveal the persistence of antisemitic tropes under the guise of anti-imperialist
foreign policy. But moreover, the SED could not admit the shortcomings of its myth-building
efforts and the failure to indoctrinate its entire population with belief in East German moral
superiority and legitimacy as the successor to the German tradition.
In the following decades, the Jews would continue to struggle for recognition and
protection of its sites by the SED, and the SED would continue to shape its image and history to
achieve legitimacy. The changing conditions of the Cold War in the 1970s in particular,
however, would introduce an international audience and increasingly conscious East German
public, placing greater pressure on the SED to address the Jewish question. The next chapter
explains how it does.
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Chapter 3: Laws
Arguably the most significant events of the 1970s were the softening of Cold War
tensions between East and West Germany. West German chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik,1
which Brandt and his supporters painstakingly constructed throughout his tenure (1969-1974,
ended the Hallstein Doctrine, by which the Federal Republic of Germany refused to recognize
the German Democratic Republic and denied diplomatic relations with any states that had
relations with the DDR. With support from Moscow, 2Brandt’s efforts to normalize relations
between East and West Germany resulted in the signing of the Basic Treaty between the two
German states in 1972, and then the admission of both states to the United Nations in 1973.
To the East Berlin Jewish community, however, perhaps the more important events of
that decade happened right before their eyes: Their cemeteries, which they had struggled to
maintain for over twenty years, suddenly came under protection as monuments of national
importance. For the first time in its history, the DDR claimed a responsibility to care for and
preserve the Weissensee cemetery, the largest cemetery in Europe, which had been damaged
countless times by neglect or outright vandalism.
These changes, monumental on different levels, were connected by the DDR’s pursuit of
legitimacy. Once it became the subject of international attention and scrutiny as an independent
country the DDR needed to keep pace with global trends toward inclusiveness in many areas of
policy. These trends even applied to the practice of historic preservation and, by extension, to the
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SED’s portrayal of history. The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of a new theory that, unlike
previous strategies of myth-building, unambiguously laid claim to the socialist and antifascist
“tradition” as well as to German “heritage,” leading to a “rediscovery” of the Jewish past as well,
as Alan Nothnagle put it.3
In reality, however, the developments of the 1970s and 1980s were not so simple. The
SED did not all of a sudden “rediscover” its Jewish citizens and their past; in fact, their
relationship and the ways it affected the maintenance of Jewish sites remained largely
unchanged. Jews in the DDR still depended on the regime for support and were reluctant to
criticize it, even when it made decisions to the Jewish community’s detriment. What did change
in this period was the attitudes of other East Germans, who developed a consciousness for human
rights and an awareness of injustice against Jews in their own country. And in a new era of
global pressure and public opinion, the SED could not ignore the protesting voices of its
constituents.

Effects and limits of rapprochement
Détente between the two German states did not mean reconciliation between their
interpretations of the past, and in fact, at several points it seemed to further entrench the
differences between East and West. The Basic Treaty, passed on December 21, 1972, established
“normal, good-neighborly relations” between the BRD and the DDR, ensured the peace and
security of borders and called for respect of one another’s sovereignty. As noted in its preamble,
the treaty proceeded “from the historical facts and without prejudice to the different view of the
Federal Republic of German and the German Democratic Republic on fundamental questions,
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including the national question.”4 Failing to define “the historical facts,” this clause avoids
conflict and controversy and permits both East and West Germany to believe its view is the
correct one.
Upon admission to the United Nations, neither the BRD nor the DDR showed signs of
abandoning their position. The divergent views came across plainly in the two countries’ first
speeches before the UN General Assembly on September 19, 1973. Speaking on behalf of the
DDR, Foreign Minister Otto Winzler said the legitimation of the DDR in the UN was also a
legitimation of its history, in which the people and government of East Germany “have broken
once and for all with the aggressive and militaristic politics of the former imperialistic German
Reich, which bears the main burden of responsibility and guilt for two world wars that brought
nations immense sacrifice and untold suffering.”5 As before, the SED derived the DDR’s
legitimacy from a history, however constructed, of working-class revolution and Communist
resistance to Nazism.6 On the other hand, BRD Foreign Minister Walter Scheel stated the fact
that there are two Germanys before the Assembly was “a display of the face of my people: cause
and victim of the war, divided not of their own doing, now living in two countries and uncertain
of a common future.” Scheel also reiterated West Germany’s commitment to eventual German
reunification, which East Germany rejected.
An unofficial part of rapprochement was the question of East German reparations to
Jewish Holocaust survivors and their descendants, and here, too, the DDR demonstrated
consistency with its past position on the matter. Following the signing of the Basic Treaty, the
4
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Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, an American Jewish organization
established in 1951, renewed its attempts to bring East German leaders to the table and discuss
paying restitution to Jewish survivors and their descendants.7 Furthermore, the Claims
Conference tried to coerce the DDR into considering restitution in its new era of international
diplomacy by requesting “all sympathetic governments to lend their aid and assistance to this
endeavor” by ensuring that the subject of restitution be included in negotiations.8 This appeal had
little effect on Western European countries, which were quick to establish diplomatic relations
with the DDR following the country’s entry into the UN. Israel and the United States, however,
were receptive to the Claims Conference’s calls to action, and while the SED continued to deny
diplomatic relations with Israel due to its “aggressive imperialist policy”9 and in order to
preserve Arab allies in the Middle East, the regime seemed interested in what the Americans had
to say.
When the Claims Conference reached out to the SED’s Committee of Antifascist
Resistance Fighters (Komitee der Antifaschistichen Widerstandskämpfer, hereafter KdAW)
directly to arrange informal meetings, the KdAW said it would only meet with an American
citizen and “only to avoid a malicious campaign against the DDR … the KdAW would use the
talks to underline the unchanged DDR position regarding restitution claims.”10 When Benjamin
Ferencz, an American, finally met with Otto Funke, KdAW chairman, in November 1976,
Ferencz expected an offer of 500 million Marks restricted to claims of Americans only, which
would be considered acceptable by the Claims Conference. Instead, Funke delivered a statement
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from the KdAW: “inspired by humanitarian ideals,” it had decided to give a one-time donation of
$1 million toward U.S. Jewish citizens who were victims of Nazi persecution. A second
statement from Funke explicitly denied any legal or moral claims against the DDR and refused
discussion of such claims.11 The Claims Conference, frankly offended by the gesture, rejected
the donation. “Had we been given the opportunity to place before you the full magnitude of the
injuries and losses inflicted on the Jews, the absolute inadequacy of the sum mentioned in your
declaration would have become apparent,” read the Claims Conference’s response to the
KdAW.12 Despite repeated attempts to negotiate reparations, and an especially narrow failure in
1988, the SED and the international Jewish community were never able to reach a consensus on
the topic.
There were, however, areas of Cold War negotiations around which both East and West
Germany appeared to coalesce, two of which, though seemingly disparate, are significant for this
paper. One of them was historic preservation. The DDR gained unofficial admission to the
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) in 1969, an institution organized by
UNESCO to which many Western European countries already belonged. Even if in actuality the
practice was not a priority of the SED at the time, the appearance of interest in historic
preservation was sufficient to gain recognition by the institution and, the SED believed, use it as
a stepping stone to further political and diplomatic relations with member countries.13 Prior to
the signing of the Basic Treaty and the DDR’s admission into the UN, the Ministry of Culture
plainly indicated its belief that historic preservation was most useful as a means to foreign policy
11
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ends.14 The further benefits of engaging seriously in historic preservation became clear as time
went on, when East Germany’s historic preservation practices received glowing press coverage
in the West, boosting the regime’s legitimacy on the whole. An article in the British newspaper
The Guardian, for instance, reported a few months prior to the passage of the 1975 historic
preservation law, “Even before the new wave of interest, the GDR had spent considerable sums
in restoring many of the great centers of German culture which lie on its territory: Goethe’s Haus
in Weimar, the Wartburg near Eisenach where Lutehr translated the Bible into German, and the
Zwinger Gallery in Dresden.”15 That year, coincidentally, was also the International Year for
Historical Preservation and was celebrated widely across Western Europe.16
Another major event of détente was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, which began in July 1973 in Helsinki and over two years later with the signing of the
Final Act on August 1, 1975, more commonly known as the Helsinki Accords. The agreement is
known for its declaration of human rights and the commitment signatory countries made to
securing those rights. In the case of East Germany, it is often believed that the signing of the
Helsinki Accords cleared the way for East Germans to protest their regime’s failure to comply
with the agreement, marking a clear turning point in the DDR’s history.17 More recent analyses
of the human rights in the DDR show, on the contrary, that discussion of “human rights” did in
fact exist in the DDR prior to 1975; it was actually an important talking point for the DDR’s
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claim to legitimacy.18 I find that, however, that the Helsinki Accords do introduce a new era
when considering citizens’ level of comfort with speaking out against the party.
These two realms of international consensus—on the value of historic preservation and
the guarantee of human rights—became relevant for the East Berlin Gemeinde and the
Weissensee cemetery, which continued to suffer from years of neglect. Though Jews remained
cautious and reluctant to protest the regime on whose financial support they relied, other, less
vulnerable East Berliners were empowered in this new era of global attention and pressure to
speak out against injustice against the Jewish community exemplified in the cemetery, as we will
see in the third section of this chapter.

Drafting the Denkmalpflegegesetz of 1975
It was clear at the end of the 1960s that current rules were not effectively preserving
historic sites, whether toward the ideological benefit of the regime or in general. A table from the
IfD around 1965 counts just under 30,000 historical sites and monuments in the DDR with a total
replacement value of between 10 and 12 billion Marks. The cost to properly maintain them
would be just over 250 million Marks annually, nearly 50 times greater than the Ministry of
Culture’s 1967 allocation of 5 million Marks to historic preservation and 200 times greater than
that of 1974, when funding by the Ministry of Culture reached a historic low of 1.25 million
Marks.19 A different table compiles data from six socialist countries to show that the DDR also
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faced a dearth of not only funding but also personnel relative to its neighbors. For example,
while Poland had fewer monuments than the DDR (approximately 30,000 and 50,000
respectively, reported in 1974), it employed 38 million Marks in central and regional
preservation funds, while the DDR employed only 8 million. The DDR had fewer “workers in
specialized preservation firms” than any other listed country, despite having more monuments
than each.20
By the 1970s historic preservation had fallen from the priorities of the SED. This was
determined in part by General Secretary Walter Ulbricht himself, who, in addition to
standardizing the construction of residences with the Plattenbau, the concrete apartment
buildings meant to symbolize classlessness that are now stereotypical of the former East
Germany, also envisioned the construction of new, impressive “socialist city centers” to display
the technical skill and strength of the SED.21 Ulbricht’s vision endangered some of the most
historic sites in Berlin, including the Nikolaikirche, the oldest building in the city, as well as the
Berliner Dom, whose connection to the Prussian monarchy so close to the center of the city was
unfavorable to the SED.22 While these buildings were spared, others were not, such as the
thirteenth-century Paulinerkirche in Leipzig. The destructive tendencies of Ulbricht’s plan were
understandably unpopular among conservationists, not to mention economically imprudent.23
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These factors were considered in 1971 when Ulbricht was ushered out of office and replaced by
Honecker.24
From a practical standpoint, the core issue at the beginning of a new decade was the lack
of legal backing for historic preservation; enforcement was spotty, and there existed no legal
repercussions for failing to adhere to preservation rules. From an ideological standpoint, the SED
perceived East Germans lacked a ‘socialist consciousness’ and commitment to the regime. While
they may have had negative associations with the West,25 they did not necessarily have positive
associations with the East, either.
To resolve this double-faceted problem with historic preservation, SED theorists
proposed a new theory of East German history, a new conception of which objects and sites
ought to be preserved, and by 1975 there were legal consequences if they weren’t. The new
theory recognized the importance of both East Germany’s “heritage” (Erbe) and “tradition”
(Tradition). Tradition described those parts of German history that had always been honored by
the DDR’s leaders: history of the working class and revolutions and antifascism. Erbe described
parts of history that, though “ideologically less desirable,” were impossible to overlook in
Germany’s national history.26 This seems similar to the “retrograde myth-building” and
appropriation and restoration of monuments such as the Brandenburger Tor that occurred in the
1950s, but the difference was the context: While in the 1950s, SED leaders still had hopes for
German reunification under a socialist state, in the 1970s, following the passage of the Basic
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Treaty, the SED’s goal became to portray the DDR “as a Germany in its own right,” one that was
“a product of the entirety of German history.”27 At the eighth Party Conference of the SED in
1972, Kurt Hager, a member of the Ideology committee of the Politbüro, expressed this broader
understanding of German history, “Our socialist culture in the DDR protects the living
progressive artistic efforts of the past and continues it in the spirit of socialism. The socialist
society is the only real successor to all of the progressive, historical efforts and traditions of
efforts towards a human existence.”28 Revolutionary, socialist, and working-class history would
remain the top priority for the SED, but this new strategy under Honecker was designed to
promote positive association with the East German state among a broader swath of the
population—and among outside observers—in this new era of international attention.
In the late 1960s Minister for Culture Klaus Gysi and chief conservationist of the IfD
Ludwig Deiters began discussing the possibility of revising the 1961 Verordnung to strengthen
the central Institute and streamline the list of protected objects and sites. To counteract the
financial concerns, the drafters of a new decree explored the possibility of requiring preserved
buildings to have additional economic utility. The 1968 draft decree included the provision that
preserved buildings should be used “not just as tourist objects, museums, cultural houses or
clubs, rather as often as possible as hotels, restaurants and homes, as village centers, schools,
kindergartens and administrative buildings.”29 This, and abandoning Ulbricht’s costly plans for
demolishing and building new socialist city centers, could save the IfD money and put it toward
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preserving the sites deemed most significant to the history of the DDR, which were still sites
commemorating antifascist resistance and working-class history.
To truly demonstrate a commitment to preserving Erbe and Tradition, Deiters and Gysi
determined that a historic preservation law, rather than a decree, was necessary. Among the
reasons, Deiters explained at a meeting of the citizen-led Cultural Union (Kulturbund) in April
1972, was the growing international attention paid to historic preservation.30 Likely a more
pressing consideration was low morale among IfD employees. The Ministry of Culture feared
that if it failed to quickly address the problems of disorganization, underfunding, and lack of
enforcement, there would be even fewer people left to uphold the system.31 The Ministerrat, the
East German parliament, passed the DDR’s first historic preservation law on June 19, 1975.
The Denkmalpflegegesetz (literally “care of monuments law”) outlined as its goals the
preservation of monuments “in such a way that they serve the development of the socialist
consciousness, aesthetic and technical education, as well as the ethical education, of the state.”32
This sentence indicated the SED’s broader goals of indoctrination through education; not only
would DDR citizens gain a better understanding of the socialist history of the state, they would
also learn about aesthetic and technical prowess in German history and why it is important to
preserve evidence of that history—presumably the “ethical” part of education. Protected sites
would be included as monuments on a central (national) list, a regional list
(Bezirksdenkmalliste), or a district list (Kreisdenkmalliste); the assignment to one of these lists
was determined by the governments at each level “according to the relevance” of each
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monument. District preservation councils were in contact with city governments and even more
localized councils or community groups, as well as with individuals and institutions who
privately owned historic sites, and were required to inform them of their responsibilities as
owners of protected sites. The regional governments were responsible for overseeing and
ensuring the quality of the work and were required to provide a budget for preservation. The
central organ combined the capacities of the Ministry for Culture and the IfD to dictate the
scientific standards and methods of preservation and had final say in removing an object from
any list. Preservation officials at any level could also for the first time punish failure to fulfill the
expectations of the law with fines, from 10 Marks to as high as 1000 Marks (for repeated
violations within a two-year span).
The positive effects of the law on historic preservation emerged gradually. SED officials
who were apathetic to historic preservation took time to come around to the new ideological
backing, and conservationists who were used to getting their way had to adapt to newly enforced
rules and repercussions.33 In terms of funding, the benefits were clearer: Agencies and authorities
at all levels of government allocated 299 million Marks to historical buildings in just one year,
1981, compared to approximately 613 million Marks that had been spent on historical buildings
since 1949. The cash flow was expected to continue as strong, with 300 million planned for 1982
and 200 million for 1983.34 On the other hand, the new law did not remedy some of the issues
that existed before, such as the prioritization of sites in big cities to the detriment of smaller cities
and towns.35
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The Jewish cemetery in Weissensee: New status, same challenges
The Denkmalpflegegesetz defined “monument” very broadly. It could be any object that
was considered “evidence of political, cultural, and economic development, that due to its
historic, artistic, or scientific significance … has been deemed a monument by the appropriate
legislative body in the interest of the socialist society.” This included everything from war
memorials and monuments to the “culture and way of living” of the working classes, to
architecturally meaningful municipal buildings and palaces, even churches and, yes, cemeteries.
The vagueness of the law meant that the SED could add objects to the list that did not appear to
have anything to do with the “realization of the ideas of socialist patriotism and proletarian
internationalism” for reasons that fir with the message of German progress that underlay all of
East German history. As we will see with the case of the Weissensee cemetery, however, some
defended the historic significance of protected objects when they were threatened, often
revealing a disparity in the understanding of what made an object historically significant,
especially in the case of the Jewish community. Concerned citizens took advantage of the greater
visibility of Berlin and the SED’s policies in the 1970s and especially the 1980s to coerce the
SED’s vision to match theirs.
By September 1977, the Beriln Magistrat’s Department of Culture had drafted a list of
153 monuments divided into four categories for its Bezirksdenkmalliste: historical monuments,
architectural monuments, monuments of landscape and garden design, and monuments of fine
and applied arts. The category with the most monuments, by far, was the historical monuments,
which had four subsections of its own: monuments of political history, of cultural history, of
production and transportation history, and of the culture and lifestyle of the working classes. The
wide range of types of monuments reflected the Magistrat’s even broader understanding, relative
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to that expressed in the official law’s text, of the new law’s significance. By way of introduction,
the drafted list includes a “Rationale” (Begründung) section, which states that the listed objects
“belong in their entirely and diversity to the elements of the rich cultural life of our society—
whether of national or international importance, whether historical or artistic monuments,
whether from earlier centuries or from the history of the DDR.”36
According to this rationale, the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee was added to the Berlin
Bezirksdenkmalliste on September 21, 1977, as a monument of cultural history. The reasons for
registering the monument are not perfectly clear, but a look at the stated criteria for objects
considered monuments of cultural history and the addition of other Jewish sites in Berlin on
various lists, offers some insight into officials’ thinking.
A document titled “Criteria for Inclusion of Monuments in the Bezirksdenkmalliste” from
August 1976 states that monuments of cultural history should recall pioneering figures in the arts
and sciences and their achievements that “shaped artistic or scientific progress on a regional or
national level.”37 In the case of Jewish cemeteries, the fact that German figures who contributed
to the arts and sciences were buried there was apparently sufficient to warrant protection as a
monument to cultural history. This is clear in the entry for the cemetery on Schönhauser Allee.
The second Jewish cemetery in Berlin, established in 1827, was listed as a monument of cultural
history on the Zentraldenkmalliste as early as December 1975. It was typical for an entry on any
monument list to include a short description or explanation of the significance of the object, of
the person or event it memorialized. In the case of the Jewish cemetery on Schönhauser Allee,
three names are listed in parentheses below the entry: Mendelssohn, Liebermann, Meyerbeer.
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This suggests that it was because these figures38 were buried in the cemetery, it was eligible for
preservation and protection as a historical monument.
In contrast, the site of the oldest Jewish cemetery in Berlin on Große-Hamburger-Straße
was included on the 1977 Bezirksdenkmalliste as a monument to political history, alongside a
memorial to the founding of the Spartakusbund (the group led by communists Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl Liebknecht that led the 1918 Revolution), several memorials of antifascist resistance
fighters, and a memorial to Karl Marx. By way of explanation for the cemetery’s inclusion on the
list is the note, “Memorial site for the 50,000 Jewish victims who were murdered by fascists in
the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Theresienstadt.”39 Indeed, the Nazis used a space in
front of the cemetery as a gathering place for Berlin’s Jews before deporting them to the camps,
a fact that was memorialized with the erection of a bronze plaque and group of sculptures in
1985.40 The green space of the former cemetery—active between 1672 and 1827 as a Jewish
cemetery, destroyed by the Gestapo in 1943, and used as a mass grave in April 1945—was
included in an “Ensemble” of sites on Große-Hamburger-Straße and neighboring Sophienstraße
on the list of architectural monuments.41
The cemeteries on Schönhauser Allee and Große-Hamburger-Straße demonstrate the
subjectivity that pervaded historic preservation, even with the passage of new law intended to
standardize the practice across the country. A Jewish cemetery could be recognized as a
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monument to cultural history, architectural history, or political history, dependent on the aspects
emphasized and, implicitly, the degree to which it contributed to the SED’s antifascist message.
More notably, in only one instance—that of the Große-Hamburger-Straße listed as a political
historical monument—was the fact that these cemeteries represented a significant part of Jewish
life in Berlin considered relevant enough to include in the object’s description, and in no instance
did a Jewish cemetery appear to be listed as a way of celebrating German-Jewish history.
As for the Jewish cemetery in Weissensee, an entry in an earlier draft of the
Bezirksdenkmalliste from March 1976 simply lists the names of three people buried there,42
similar to the listing of the cemetery on Schönhauser Allee. In the official 1977 list, however, the
note accompanying the cemetery’s entry is, “The largest Jewish cemetery in Western Europe,
with many figures from various fields.”43 In addition, in the declaration of the cemetery’s
monument status, it is specified that the cemetery “in its entirety”—from the gravestones to the
“yellow-brick buildings [and] arcades with Corinthian columns,” to the landscaping—comes
under the law’s protection.44
The new status conferred to the cemetery did not markedly change it, at least not
immediately. The Gemeinde still struggled to take care of it; by 1980 there were only 14
employees to maintain and keep clear all 115,000 gravesites.45 The Ministry of Culture increased
annual funding to the Gemeinde allocated specifically for cemetery reparation and restoration—
as much as 170,000 Marks in 1981, more than five times as much was provided to the Gemeinde
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30 years earlier for the same purposes46—and surveyed of the state of the cemetery, identifying
areas in need of attention, which were many, and making plans to address them, such as directing
the Magistrat to send people to assist the caretakers.47 Beginning in 1980, about 40 members of
the Freie Deutsche Jugend Studentensommer (“student summer”) program spent two to three
weeks each summer doing repair and custodial work on the cemetery, cutting down trees and
mowing the lawn.48 But there was always more to repair. During one of his meetings with local
politicians to keep the Magistrat up to date on the needs of the Gemeinde, chairman Peter
Kirchner informed deputy mayor for internal affairs Günther Hoffmann of various areas in need
of repair at that moment in July 1980, such as a wall of the Schönhauser Allee cemetery and
certain significant gravesites in the Weissensee cemetery. Kirchner noted that the arrival of the
Studentensommer participants was so helpful, that he requested the program continue each year
thereafter.49
The relationship between the Gemeinde and the regime thus remained largely consistent
with that of the past decades: Jews struggled to care for the Weissensee cemetery and asked for
financial assistance from the government, but many, especially leaders of Jewish communities
across the DDR, still defended and praised the SED for supporting them. Evidence of this can be
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seen in documentation from the fortieth anniversary of the Novemberpogrom in 1978, when the
state and the association of Jewish communities across the country co-sponsored a series of
events in commemoration of the Nazis’ terror. In a published collection of the speeches from the
events, many speeches by Jewish leaders expressed gratitude toward the SED. “Living in respect
and security in the socialist German state” was the title of one of the speeches, given by the
president of the national association of Jewish communities Helmut Aris.50 In the foreword to the
collection published by the association, Aris wrote, “A deep ‘thank you’ goes out to our
fatherland, the German Democratic Republic, which, through its humanistic constitution,
guarantees us all the rights of free people, including the free exercise of religion.”51 These
speeches did, however, mark a divergence from the previous decades in two noteworthy ways:
first, embedded in the title of the collection of speeches, Gedenke! Vergiss nie! (Remember!
Never forget!), was a clear recognition of Jews’ victimhood through the Holocaust that the SED
had consistently rejected. Secondly, only a few of the speeches made mention of ‘neo-Nazi’ or
‘neo-fascist’ tendencies there. For perhaps the first time, the state did not use Jewish suffering or
discussion of antisemitism to compare itself with the BRD for political leverage (though a
contrast is implicit in several mentions of “the socialist German state”).52
Whether the SED assigned people to care for the cemetery as purely “propagandistic and
publicity work assignments,” as Lothar Mertens claims,53 or whether it felt responsible for its
state of disrepair and now felt propelled to act on it, recognizing the Weissensee cemetery’s
protected status, is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is that a failure to demonstrate
50
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support of the Gemeinde in this material way would have been used as evidence of the SED’s
neglectful or actively harmful of treatments of Jews within the DDR by the Western media,
which continued to portray the East German government as oppressive and backwards. The
SED’s dependency on the Jewish community in this way thus remained consistent in the new era
of international attention; it perhaps became even more important. One article in the Los Angeles
Times in October 1977 cited a shrinking Jewish population as the root of most of the Gemeinde’s
problems, but also faulted the regime for apathy toward the cemetery in particular. Kirchner, the
chair of the Gemeinde, was quoted in the article saying, “The government doesn’t really care. It
knows the East German Jews are gradually dying out. The cemetery is overgrown with weeds
and trees. It’s a disgrace.”54 Coverage from West Germany also tended to highlight the failures
of the SED, such as in one Tagesspiegel article from 1979 reporting on the disrepair of East
Berlin’s cemeteries that concluded with the following damning remark: “What the Nazis
couldn’t accomplish is now being taken care of by the ravages of time.”55 Such negative
reporting—drawing a direct association between the Nazis and the SED, which the SED had
spent its entire existence denying—was not inconsequential to East German leaders, either,
evidenced by the fact that the Tagesspiegel article had been clipped out and saved in the
Magistrat’s files.56
The Magistrat addressed worry about negative press head on, such as during that July
1980 meeting with Kirchner, when Deputy Mayor Hoffmann asked if there had been any work
relating to public relations. Kirchner replied that in the Weissensee cemetery there was currently
one film being filmed, and another awaiting approval from the state secretary for church
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matters.57 In internal correspondence, too, local officials warned against the damaging effects of
such negative press, not necessarily on the SED’s reputation abroad but apparently on the Jewish
citizens of East Berlin themselves. When the Gemeinde requested 300,000 Marks to repair its
synagogue on Rykestraße in March 1976, the Office of Internal Affairs determined that it could
cover the cost of repair, but not the cost of scaffolding required to complete the repair. However,
in a notice to the mayor of East Berlin, Kurt Helbig, the deputy mayor for interior and executive
affairs, urged,
For political reasons, we consider it necessary not to postpone the repair of the
synagogue, the only place of worship of the Gemeinde in the capital. Right now the
Jewish community [and] its chairman Dr. Kirchner, are being attacked and slandered in
the mass media of West Berlin and the BRD for their position against Zionism.58
While East German Jews did face criticism from abroad, largely about the DDR’s refusal to pay
reparations to survivors of the Holocaust and for its anti-Zionist stance,59 Jews in the DDR who
were sympathetic to Israel were not safe from the SED’s slander as “Zionists,” either; this paper
has already outlined several instances of the SED using the label “Zionist” to discredit Jews who
opposed the regime. East Germany’s long-standing anti-Israel foreign policy stance on antiimperialist grounds culminated in 1975, when the DDR voted in favor of a UN resolution
declaring Zionism a form of racism.60
While the SED had espoused an anti-Israel policy tinged with antisemitism for years, it
was only in the mid-1970s, after the DDR supported the UN resolution, that the policy received

57

LAB C Rep. 104, Nr. 626, Notiz über das Gespräch des Stellvertreters des Oberbürgermeisters für Inneres,
Genossen Hoffmann, mit dem Vorsitzenden der Jüdischen Gemeinde von Berlin, Herrn Dr. Kirchner, am 17. 7. 80,”
July 23, 1980.
58
LAB C Rep. 104, Nr. 596, “Aktennotiz für den Oberbürgermeister,” March 25, 1976.
59
“Behind the Headlines the Jews of East Germany,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, January 7, 1981,
60
Jeffrey Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967–1989
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2016), 288.

86

significant pushback from East Germans—especially non-Jewish East Germans.61 This was one
example of a wider development across the East German population that took place in the 1970s
and 1980s, a development that proved most important for the protection and restoration of
Jewish sites. While many aspects of the past few decades remained consistent—the Jews’
dependence on the government for support, the SED’s concern for Jewish sites primarily out of
concern for its own image—the attitude of average citizens had begun to change. They began
questioning and critiquing the actions of the SED towards its Jewish citizens in a broader
movement for human rights, garnering international attention that previous protests did not. One
case in 1986, when a peculiar plan to build a street over the Weissensee cemetery became public,
shows the coalescence of East German activists around a site of distinct Jewish importance. The
SED came under fire by citizens for violating the protected status of the cemetery, eventually
forcing the government to change course.
In the mid-1980s the Berlin Magistrat began discussions on a plan to build a road through
the Weissensee cemetery. The construction plan originated when the cemetery was first
established, in 1880, to connect the outer neighborhood of Berlin to the city center, and back
then the area promised to the city government did not actually transect the cemetery. The Jewish
community signed a treaty in 1915, agreeing to not bury any bodies in the promised area. But the
Jewish community foresaw a future need for expansion and included in the second paragraph its
intent to buy the land on the other side of the promised area and continue the cemetery there.62
Whether due to war or simply oversight, construction never began, and the 300-meter-long and
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36-meter-wide area remained empty as the Jewish community continued to expand and bury its
members, even opening a second entrance for the cemetery.
Then, 70 years later, the plans for a major connecting road through the cemetery were
once again relevant because of the establishment of Hohenschönhausen, a new district on the
outskirts of Berlin. The Gemeinde did not outwardly oppose the plans, since the area had been
kept clear for this purpose. The plans also had proposed a new, somewhat less intrusive design
for the road: a six-lane road slightly below the level of the cemetery, with a bridge over the road
connecting the two parts of the cemetery, rather than the original ploughed road directly through
the cemetery.63 The Gemeinde thus agreed to the construction, in principle, in June 1986 in a
letter to the City Council for Interior Matters, requesting that the construction not create
“inconsiderable difficulties for the cemetery operation, the work of the employees, nor for
visitors.”64
While the leadership of the Gemeinde, cognizant of its dependence on the government,
may not have been in a position to loudly protest the construction, other citizens, Jews and nonJews alike, prodded the government for answers about the plans, in line with a broader
movement across the DDR for greater transparency and attention to human rights from the SED.
Almost immediately after the Gemeinde agreed to the plan in June 1986, letters arrived from
Stefan Heym, a Jewish and socialist author who had fled Germany in the 1930s and studied in
the U.S. before returning to the DDR. Despite his ideological leanings, he had been critical of the
SED for its censorship of writers. The road construction was one more instance of the regime’s
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infringements on citizens’ civil rights in the DDR; the proposed route was also in close
proximity to the grave of Heym’s wife.65
Another leader of the human rights movement in East Berlin was artist Bärbel Bohley,
who wrote a letter to the SED’s Central Committee protesting the construction over the
cemetery. Bohley had collected 130 signatures on the letter and sent it to East Berlin Mayor
Erhard Krack, as well, in July 1986. It was “irresponsible to destroy a piece of cultural history,”
Bohley wrote, “that is not only of the Jews’ history, but of ours as well,” recalling the same
language used by the Berlin government to justify historic preservation a decade earlier.66
Making matters more uncomfortable for politicians, Bohley shared her complaints and the story
of the government’s hypocritical actions with members of the Western press, ushering in an
avalanche of requests from Western media companies to film and photograph the cemetery. The
East Berlin Magistrat denied media requests and the claim that the cemetery would be divided,
following the advice of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which granted external media
permission and warned in an internal report that the story would be “played up by imperialist
media as ‘cemetery desecration’” in order to “disparage the DDR.”67
The case of Thomas Heise, who sent two letters several months apart inquiring about the
construction plans, allows us to understand how one person’s opinion could change on the
matter, and perhaps points to a changing mindset among the population as a whole. Heise, a
resident of the Friedrichshain neighborhood of Berlin who “closely follows the development of
Berlin,” sent a letter to the editors at the Berliner Zeitung in April 1986 asking if there existed
plans to build a street through the cemetery. The letter’s tone was deferent to the SED: “I notice
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those projects designed and implemented with great dedication and love, how the party of the
working class cares for the well-being of its citizens,” he wrote. The question was also not
intended to be accusatory; Heise offered his speculations about the roads that could be extended
through the cemetery, finding the plan an extremely beneficial one that would “enormously”
save time.68 Evidently, the paper’s editors had responded that they were not aware of any such
plans, for several months later, in September, Heise sent a second letter to the Berliner Zeitung
after learning from the Gemeinde’s president Kirchner that there were, in fact, such plans. In
stark contrast to the previous letter, Heise’s tone turns accusatory and defiant. He deeply regrets
that such a “mistake of urban construction” could take place, and that the paper was uninformed
of the plan was “inexcusable.” He continued,
A road through the cemetery has not only irreparable ecological consequences; it also
turns the formula (Formel) of moral and ethical responsibility toward the Jewish people
into a hypocritical formula! Inform the readers of your paper aobut the construction work
and call on them, as responsible citizens, to speak out.69
The paper’s publishers forwarded the letter to the deputy mayor for internal affairs
Günter Hoffmann and requested that he respond directly to Heise.70 Hoffmann did a month later,
assuring Heise, in one sentence, that there were no plans to build a street through the Jewish
cemetery in Weissensee.71 Indeed, by the time Hoffmann responded to Heise the plans for the
construction had been called off by Erich Honecker himself after hearing from “the other side,”72
Once again, the fear of ostracism on an international stage forced the SED to change its
course and messaging. This was a new phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s as the DDR gained

68

LAB C Rep. 104, Nr. 596, Letter from Thomas Heise to BZA editors, April 20, 1986.
LAB C Rep. 104, Nr. 596, Letter from Thomas Heise to BZA editors, September 23, 1986.
70
LAB C Rep. 104, Nr. 596, Letter from Berliner Verlag Central Correspondence Department to Deputy Mayor for
Internal Affairs Günter Hoffmann,
71
LAB C Rep. 104, Nr. 596, Letter from Günter Hoffmann to Thomas Heise, October 21, 1986.
72
Letter from Erich Honecker to Heinz Galinski, October 1, 1986. Cited in Mertens, Davidstern unter Hammer und
Zirkel, 269.
69

90

international attention, for both good reasons and bad. Something also changed within the DDR,
however, as a result of Cold War détente, and it was the role of DDR citizens. Stefan Heym,
Bärbel Bohley, and Thomas Heise were only a few activists who spoke out against the SED’s
abuses of civil and human rights, in the one instance highlighted here, on behalf of the struggling
Jewish community of East Berlin. But their activism could happen because of a confluence of
international geopolitical decisions and domestic ideological strategy. The citizens of the DDR
challenged the SED, using the very same language the SED had used to talk about human rights
and historic preservation to force the state to adapt, and, eventually, it succeeded.
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Conclusion
Around the time Honecker called off the plans to build a road over the Weissensee
cemetery, conversation about Jewish life in East Germany—or the lack thereof—seemed to
reach a fever pitch. More and more Western newspapers began reporting on “How the other
Germans treat their Jews,”1 noting, as Richard Kostelanetz did, the state of disrepair of such sites
as the cemeteries and the (embarrassingly) still bombed-out synagogue on Oranienburger Straße.
Stories about neo-Nazis in the DDR and accusations that the SED had been complacent in the
face of “virulent” antisemitism “stung” the party, and its leaders promised to launch
investigations into such claims.2 Domestic interest in Jewish history and culture also increased.
Irene Runge, a native New Yorker who moved to East Germany as a child, founded a Jewish
cultural group in 1986 called “Wir für uns” (“For ourselves”). A member of the generation of
Jews who grew up in the DDR, often to Communist parents who rejected their Jewish heritage,
Runge felt distant from her Jewishness but found the organized Gemeinde unwelcoming,
desiring a space to become reacquainted with Jewish religion and culture outside without the
limits of orthodoxy.3
Interest in Jewish culture and history among Christians particularly grew in the 1980s, as
they began to question the Church’s complicity in the Holocaust and the DDR’s handling of the
Nazi past.4 The Conference of the Protestant Leadership wrote, “An enormous guilt lies on our
people … In light of the failure and manifest guilt of Christianity, today everything must be done
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to spread knowledge about historic and contemporary Jewry.”5 Other groups came out stronger
against the DDR and the SED directly, such as leaders of the East German Protestant peace
movement who wrote in 1985 that “the great majority of the people who then became citizens of
the DDR” were complicit in the Nazi terror because of “their passivity and silence.”6
In 1988, the year that would mark fifty years since the Novemberpogrom of 1938,
Honecker introduced the SED’s most ambitious project yet in honor of the Jewish community:
the restoration of the Neue Synagoge on Oranienburger Straße and creation of a Jewish museum
inside. The decision came after the SED had previously rejected five requests to build a Jewish
museum—the most recent in 1981. Klaus Gysi, a Communist of Jewish descent who was the
state secretary for church matters at the time, suggested that the move was potentially a sign of
the DDR’s willingness to accept responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi regime.7 Indeed, the
previous year, Honecker had begun discussions with the World Jewish Congress about
restitution for emigrated Jews of German descent.8 In November, to commemorate the fiftieth
anniversary of the Novemberpogrom, the state broke ground on the synagogue as it hosted
lectures, film screenings, and other events about German-Jewish history.
In the summer of 1989, the East Berlin Magistrat announced a competition, in
collaboration with local artists and architects, for the design of a monument to honor “the work
of Jewish citizens in Berlin, to reflect on their persecution and to honor their resistance.”9 But it
was never completed, interrupted by a different crisis for the SED: the unintentional opening of
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the borders with the West and the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. It had come after
months of peaceful protests by East German citizens, calling for greater freedom to travel and
protection of human rights. Once the wall had fallen, it appeared the East German experiment
had as well: Citizens no longer believed in a wall that was put up to keep out the fascists on the
other side, if they ever believed it in the first place.10 The Peaceful Revolution of 1989
introduced the first real free, democratic elections in the DDR in March 1990, when the people
voted out the SED in favor of a political party called the “Alliance for Germany.” Christian
Democrat Lothar de Maizière was elected prime minister on a platform promising reunification,
and one of his first acts upon taking office on April 12, 1990, was to accept responsibility, on
behalf of the East German people, for the crimes of the Nazis.11 De Maizière’s short tenure as the
first and only democratically elected prime minister of the German Democratic Republic ended
on Ovtober 3, 1990, when the DDR became part of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Reunification brought with it great upheaval of many aspects of the lives of former East
Germans. In the case of the Jewish cemetery in Berlin-Weissensee, the years following
reunification saw the initiation of dozens of restoration projects, an effort to restore each
overturned, overgrown, still war torn gravesite in one of the largest Jewish cemeteries in
Europe.12 In 2005, for the 125th anniversary of the cemetery’s consecration, supporters of the
cemetery encouraged the local government to increase funding in order to make a bid to add the
cemetery to the UNESCO list of World Heritage Sites, which the Berlin Senat agreed to do in
conjunction with the Jewish community and the Foundation of the Neue Synagoge - Centrum
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Judaicum.13 Though the cemetery was not chosen for the list, work continues to this day to
survey and restore each of its over 115,000 gravestones.
--The goal of this project is not to make an indictment of the SED and the DDR for only
honoring its Jewish citizens and the sites important to their history—indeed, recognizing them as
part of East German history—when it appeared global pressure demanded it. It was, rather, to
understand why that may have been the case. The answer comes down to survival, for both the
Jews and the regime. In a position of great vulnerability, still subjected to antisemitism and
persecution for their religion—albeit a different brand of it—the small population of Jews in East
Germany had just enough bargaining power, without speaking out against the SED, to just
maintain its services and properties. The SED, on the other hand, balanced a myth of antifascist
resistance with an image of progressiveness and legitimacy, either of which could be undermined
by a dissatisfied Jewish community. The fate of one was intertwined with the other, until, in the
case of the Jewish community, others started to notice injustice and protested to stop it.
Today, some consider the German term Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to terms
with the past”) to have two meanings: it’s original meaning, dealing with the memory of the Nazi
regime and its war and genocide, and, after reunification, dealing with the memory of the East
German dictatorship and its extensive, nearly omniscient surveillance state, restrictions on
freedom, and oppression of dissident voices.14 Opponents of the SED have drawn parallels
between two the undemocratic regimes. The aforementioned leaders of the East German
Protestant peace movement disparaged the DDR in 1985, “Coming to terms with the past
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includes the obligation to actively oppose the system of fear and threat and injustice and misuse
of power within our own society.”15 Even scholars of today have compared the two, as James E.
Young did, somewhat glibly, in discussing the SED’s reluctance to accept Jews as victims of
fascism:
to mourn the victims of anti-Jewish terror was perceived as deflecting from the mission at
hand: it was to identify with those who liberated the camps and not with the victims of
tyranny. For, as victims of past tyranny, East Germans might have identified themselves a
little too easily as victims of current tyranny, as well.16
The similarities seem even stronger when considering a particular strain of work on the Jewish
experience in the DDR, where Jews lived “between repression and tolerance,”17 just to be
“instrumentalized” by the party and state.18
To interpret the story of Jews in the DDR in these ways, however, is to understand Jews
simply as victims of SED repression, or beneficiaries of regime patronage only when politically
convenient for the party. But in reality, Jews in East Germany preserved their traditions, their
properties, and themselves with creativity and persistence—and occasionally a little external
support. To recall the words Felix Bergmann wrote to protest the Buchenwald memorial in 1960,
“We have survived German fascism, and we are preparing to outlast the DDR, too.”
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